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PERSONAL INJURY HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION: 
A PROPOSAL FOR TORT REFORM 
Mark D. Seltzer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article will propose a framework for personal injury hazard-
ous waste litigation that would make it easier for exposed victims of 
hazardous waste contamination to maintain a prima facie tort case 
for damages in state courts. Under existing case law, persons ex-
posed to hazardous waste pollution have not received compensation 
through the state court system. Public law has proved similarly 
unreceptive to private parties with hazardous waste damage claims.1 
In recognition of the scientific, medical, and legal problems unique to 
hazardous waste injuries, this article suggests a reduction of the 
evidentiary and substantive legal burdens that a potential plaintiff 
must bear in seeking compensatory relief. 
A. The Hazardous Waste Problem 
Every year millions of tons of hazardous wastes are discarded into 
the environment.2 The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) estimated that in 1980 alone 57 million metric tons of 
hazardous waste were generated throughout the nation. s It was 
• Second-year Staff Member, BOSTON CoLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. See infra text and notes at notes 32-36. 
2. OFFICE OF WATER & WASTE MANAGEMENT. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRoTECTION AGENCY, 
EVERYBODY'S PRoBLEM: HAzARDous WASTE 1 (SW-826) (1980). See Senkan & Stauffer, What 
To Do With. Hazo:rdo'Us Waste, 84 TECH. REv. 34 (Novemberli>ecember 1981). 
3. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, HAzARDous WASTE MANAGEMENT PR0-
GRAM WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE: GREATER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED 1 (CED-79-14) (Jan. 23, 1979) 
(Report to Congress). The source of this projection is given as the EPA. That agency estimated 
that 35 million metric tons per year of hazardous waste will be subjected to regulation. 43 Fed. 
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predicted that 90 percent of that was disposed of improperly, 
thereby presenting "significant imminent hazards" to the public 
health.' Experts estimate that of the approximately 50,000 hazard-
ous waste disposal sites in the country, between 1300 and 34,000 
sites contain substantial amounts of hazardous wastes which could 
damage human health or the environment.6 
The existence of hazardous waste sites near residential com-
munities has gradually added to the public health burden and risk of 
disease.6 Environmental exposure to chemical carcinogens and tox-
ins emanating from hazardous waste sites has become so widespread 
that environmentally-induced cancer and disease is now considered a 
major public health problem.7 Some epidemiological studies have 
concluded that environmental factors cause from 70 to 90 percent of 
all cancers.8 
Reg. 58,946, 58,946-47 (1978). See EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE INFORMATION 2 (3d ed. 1980). See 
also B. BROWN, LAYING WASTE - THE POISONING OF AMERICA By TOXIC CHEMICALS 293 (1980). 
The author estimates that if current trends continue, 400 million tons of hazardous waste will 
be released into the environment in 1984. Id. 
4. B. BROWN, supra note 3, at 293. See COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 181 (1979); AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON THE EVALUA-
TION OF Low LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICAL CARCINOGENS, REPORT TO THE SURGEON 
GENERAL, Evaluation of Environmental Carcinogens (1970) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO 
THE SURGEON GENERAL]; Fisher, The Toxic Waste Dump Problem And A Suggested Insurance 
Program, 8 B. C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 421, 425 (1980). 
5. See Fred C. Hart Associates, Preliminary Assessment of Cleanup Costs for National 
Hazardous Waste Problems 22 (E.P.A. Contract No. 68-01-5063) (1979); SUBCOMM. ON OVER-
SIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 
1ST SESS., HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL 1 (Comm. Print 96-1 IFC 31, 1979). Wolf, Public Op-
position to Hazardous Waste Sites, 8 B. C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV. 463, 469-70 (1980). 
6. Interview with Dr. Larry Brown, Director of the Community Health Improvement Pro-
gram, Harvard University (Jan. 12, 1982). See, Cancer Deaths Tied to Wastes in Jersey Study, 
N.Y. Times, July 8, 1982, at B1; Lennet, Handling Hazardous Waste, Environment, Oct. 
1980, at 7; HOUSE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE ACT: 
REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 1480, H.R. Doc. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980). 
7. S. EpSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 2 (1978). In his State of the Union Address to Con-
gress, President Carter cited improper disposal of hazardous wastes as "one of the most im-
portant environmental and public health issues" facing the United States. President's State of 
the Union Address 1980, quoted in [1980]10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1895. According to Tennessee 
Congressman Albert Gore, the unsafe disposal of hazardous wastes is "the single most impor-
tant environmental health issue of the decade." Costle, Taming Chemical Wastes, 5 EPA 
JOURNAL 2-3 (1979). With the dearth of private litigation of potentially legitimate claims by 
hazardous waste victims, it is difficult to measure the significance of the hazardous waste 
problem in unpaid damages to potential plaintiffs, particularly where no successful suits have 
been brought. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COMM. ON 
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, U.S. SENATE, 96TH CONG., 13TH SESS., SIX CASE STUDIES OF 
COMPENSATION FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES POLLUTION 496-97 (June 1980) [hereinafter cited as SIX 
CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION]. 
8. S. EpSTEIN, supra note 7. B. BROWN, supra note 3, at 329. 
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In Woburn, Massachusetts, a dangerous hazardous waste site ex-
ists which exemplifies the problematic environmental and health con-
sequences which can result from the dumping of hazardous wastes.9 
On October 23, 1981, the EPA identified the site, known as the 
Mark-Phillips Trust, as one of the ten worst dumpsites in the United 
States10 and targeted it for federally subsidiZed cleanup under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act of 1980 (CERCLA).l1 Earlier, the agency had discovered 
waste deposits on the site containing high concentrations of two 
known human carcinogens, arsenic and chromium, as well as other 
chemical contaminants.12 
In May, 1979, two municipal drinking water wells near the site 
were closed after high levels of several toxic contaminants were 
found in the water.18 Previollsly, the wells had been the principal 
9. The site covers approximately 300 acres. It was used for over a century as a disposal area 
for industrial hazardous wastes. Woburn is a city of 35,000 located about 12 miles northwest of 
Boston. It was a major leather processing and chemical production center in the 19th and early 
20th centuries. Today, Woburn is both a residential community and an industrial center. See 
Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass., filed June 15, 1982). 
The EPA has proposed an expanded list of the 418 most dangerous hazardous waste sites in 
the nation. National Priorities List, 47 Fed. Reg. 58,476 (Dec. 30, 1982). The Mark-Phillips 
Trust site ranked fourth on the list; Woburn Wells G and H ranked 39th. [d. Woburn residents 
have publicly charged that the EPA cleanup efforts have been delayed without justification. 
Boston Globe, Feb. 23, 1983, at 6, 8. 
10. The ranking of the 114 top-priority hazardous waste sites was based on a hazardous 
scoring system with greatest emphasis placed on potential threat to public health. Pollution via 
three "pathways" - air, ground water, and surface water - was measured for potential im-
pacts. Announcement of Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, EPA (Oct. 23, 1981) reprinted in 
[1981] ENV'T REp. (BNA) 1028. 
11. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 42 U.S.C. S§ 9601-9657 (1980), commonly known as Super-
fund, provides a $1.6 billion fund, financed by industry and the federal government, to clean 
up improperly disposed hazardous wastes where responsible parties cannot be determined or 
cannot afford to pay for cleanup. In instances where responsible parties can be identified and 
are solvent, the legislation permits the government to recover the cleanup costs from the party 
that caused the damage. 
12. DEP'T OF URBAN AND ENVT'L POLICY, TuFTS UNIVERSITY, HAZARDOUS WASTES IN WOBURN, 
11 (May 1980) [hereinafter cited as HAZARDOUS WASTES IN WOBURN]. EPA officials learned 
that there was an open pit - a dry lagoon - covering nearly an acre of land in which arsenic 
was piled in a caked white powder several feet thick. "So concentrated were the arsenic, lead 
and other chemicals that a mere 45 pounds of the soil would be enough to administer a lethal 
dosage to 100 adults." B. BROWN, supra note 3, at 115. 
13. Wells G and H of East Woburn were closed after they were found to contain 
tricholoethylene (TCE), a known carcinogen, transdicloroethylene, tricholoethane, benzene, 
and chloroform. The wells are a half-mile to three-quarters of a mile from the waste site. 
HAZARDOUS WASTES IN WOBURN, supra note 12, at 11. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., No. 
82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 15, 1982). The concentration of TCE found in wells G and H is 
148 times the level of lifetime exposure to TCE which can be expected to cause one additional 
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source of water for East W oburn.14 Stockpiles of uncovered animal 
hides discovered at the site were leaching toxic chemicals into both 
ground and surface waters. 15 Methane gas, a by-product of the waste 
materials, seeped into buildings constructed on the site in such ex-
plosive concentrations as to force evacuation.16 In addition, residents 
of the nearby Town of Reading, which is downwind from the site, 
have complained of noxious fumes released into the air from the 
waste piles.17 
Residents living near the Woburn site have alleged that the con-
taminants emanating from the area have caused substantial 
injuries.1s Independent evidence indicates that since 1969 a signifi-
cant outbreak of death and disease has occurred in Woburn. In 
January, 1981, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of 
cancer in an exposed population of one million people. [d. The concentration is also twice the 
guideline amount established by the EPA to protect against acute illness from a 10-day ex-
posure. [d. 
14. Written Statement of Rev. Bruce A. Young, Priest, Trinity Episcopal Church, Woburn, 
Massachusetts, reprinted in Heari:r/4s Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research, 
Committee on Lab01" and Human Relations, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 96th Cong., 
2d 8ess. (June 6, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Health Hearings]. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 
No. 82-1672-8 (D. Mass., filed June 15, 1982). 
15. HAZARDOUS WASTES IN WOBURN. supra note 12, at 11. It is alleged that these chemical 
toxins have also percolated down into the local watertable aquifer, which runs directly 
underneath the hazardous waste site, thereby exposing a principal source of local domestic 
water supply in the region (and previously for contaminated Wells G and H) to the hazard of 
contamination from the disposal pits. [d. 
The arsenic has been scattered widely by winds and rain and has contaminated a river water-
shed known as the Aberjona which passes through the site and flows into the Mystic Lakes and 
River. Much of the land area at the site is, or was at one time, wetlands which contributed to 
the river system. Many of these wetlands and a pond were used as receptacles for waste 
materials and now no longer exist. Towns downstream in these disposal areas are threatened 
by runoff or leachate from the toxic deposits. [d., at 2. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., No. 
82-1672-8 (D. Mass., filed June 15, 1982). 
16. In December 1979, buildings in the industrial park had to be evacuated when methane 
gas was discovered coming in through the foundation. Methane gas is combustible and officials 
were concerned that an explosion would result; no explosion did occur. See HAZARDOUS 
WASTES IN WOBURN. supra note 12, at 9-11. 
17. Memorandum in Opposition to Entry of Final Judgment at 3, Dep't Envt'l Quality 
Eng'g, Att'y Gen. Commw. Mass., Town of Reading v. Trustees of Mark-Phillip Trust, No. 
22690 Mass. 8up. Ct. (1980). 
18. Health Hearings, supra note 14, at 20 (statement of Mrs. Anne Anderson, Woburn 
homeowner and mother of three-year-old leukemia victim); id. at 22 (statement of Mrs. 
Broderick, Reading resident and homeowner). 
In,Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., No. 82-1672-8 (D. Mass. filed June 15, 1982). Plaintiffs allege 
that due to their consumption of substantial quantities of contaminated drinking water "over 
the course of many years" from wells G and H, each plaintiff has contracted or "faces an in-
creased risk" of leukemia, other cancers, liver disease, central nervous system disorders, and 
"other unknown illness and disease." [d. at 2. 
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Public Health (DPH) reported that the incidence of childhood 
leukemia and renal cancer in Woburn had significantly increased 
over the rates expected based on statewide experience.19 DPH also 
confirmed an earlier study that found Woburn's cancer mortality 
rates to be significantly higher than rates for the state as a whole. 20 
Three miles south of the Woburn waste site a cluster of eight 
childhood leukemia cases was reported within a half-mile radius in an 
East Woburn neighborhood.21 For that half-mile census tract, which 
encompasses the southern portion of the town, less than one case 
would be expected over a fifteen-year period.22 Seven of the eight 
children have since died.28 
In response to the contamination, various governmental authori-
ties, including federal agencies,24 have taken broad remedial action 
19. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH, STUDY OF WOBURN 
CANCER INCIDENCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 1969-1978, at 2 (Jan. 23, 1981) [hereinafter 
cited as DPH STUDY]. 
In the Town of Woburn, for the years 1969 through 1978, at least 14 cases of acute childhood 
leukemia, blood cancer, have been identified where only seven cases would be expected. This 
excess is statistically significant, as the likelihood of such a large difference occurring by ran-
dom chance is less than 6 in 1,000. Thirty cases of renal cancer were observed for the period 
1969 to 1978, whereas 19.4 were expected. RESOURCE LOSSES FROM SURFACE WATER, GROUND-
WATER AND ATMOSPHERIC CONTAMINATION - A CATALOG, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS. 99-100 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as RESOURCE LOSSES STUDY]; Anderson v. Cryovac., Inc., No. 82-1672-S (D. 
Mass. filed June 15, 1982). 
20. Of the 70 largest Massachusetts communities, Woburn's cancer mortality rate is 13 per-
cent higher than expected for the years from 1969 to 1978. In the 1974 to 1978 period alone, 
deaths from cancer in Woburn were elevated by 23 percent, which is statistically significant; it 
is a higher rate than any other community rate in the state. Examined by specific cancer type, 
for the 10-year period 1969 to 1978, more deaths than would have been expected also occurred 
from cancer of the liver, female organs, kidney, prostate, breast, bronchus, lung, pancreas, 
and stomach. Also, the overall death rate in Woburn was 8 percent higher than expected. DPH 
STUDY, supra note 19, at 4. 
The Community Health Improvement Program at the Harvard University School of Public 
Health is conducting a health survey of the entire Woburn community to determine morbidity 
rates, focusing on the incidence of stillbirths, miscarriages, birth defects, and illnesses ranging 
from asthma to hives. Interview with Dr. Larry Brown, supra note 6. 
21. These figures represent the years between 1966 and 1978. RESOURCE LOSSES STUDY, 
supra note 19, at 100. 
A Boston pediatric hematologist, Dr. John Truman, reported to the United States Center 
For Disease Control that he has observed six cases of acute leukemia in the same six-block area 
of Woburn since 1972. This is a statistically anomalous rate since some other nearby 
neighborhoods were nearly normal in cancer incidence. DPH STUDY, supra note 19, at 2. 
22. RESOURCE LoSSES STUDY, supra note 19. The random probability of this discrepancY oc-
curring is less than 2 in 10,000. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed June 
15,1982). 
23. Interview with Rev. Bruce Young, Priest, Trinity Episcopal Church, Woburn, Mas-
sachusetts (Nov. 24, 1981). . 
24. At the federal level, there are two agencies primarily involved with the Woburn hazard· 
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to clean up the sources of the pollution. State26 and local26 authorities 
ous waste site: the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Already the EPA has re-
ceived a quarter of a million dollars in pre-Superfund money for testing and assessment. 
Sehaplowsky, Studies Shed Light on Woburn's Woes, Not Man Apart, July, 1981, at 13. In ad-
dition, the EPA and Corps of Engineers together administer the section 404 wetlands provi-
sions of the federal Water Pollution Control Acts amendments of 1972 (P.L. 94-500, 86 Stat. 
816, 33 U.S.C. 5 1151), which authorizes the Corps to issue permits for the discharge of 
dredged or fill materials into all U.S. waters and adjacent wetlands. The Act was invoked by 
both agencies in response to the fill deposited in wetland areas of the site and unsuitable flood 
storage provided for the upper Aberjona River. HAZARDOUS WASTES IN WOBURN, supra note 
12, at 13. 
25. Public remedial action at the state level involved successive legal actions by jurisdic-
tionally overlapping state agencies, intervening local governments, and private interests over 
a three-year period, culminating in a final judgment agreement certified on December 30, 
1980, by the Suffolk Superior Court of Massachusetts. Agreement For Judgment, Dep't of 
Env'tl Quality Eng'g, Att'y Gen. of the Commw. of Mass., City of Woburn, and Town of 
Reading v. D'Annolfo, et al., Mass. Sup. Ct., No. 22690. 
The myriad of actions grew out of the noxious odors and airborne pollutants released into 
the air by the waste material at the Mark-Phillips Trust dumpsite. The release was said to 
violate an array of state regulations, including the Massachusetts Clean Air Act, MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 111, 55 142A-142I (West 1981), the Massachusetts Clean Waters Act, MAss. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, SS 26-53 (West 1981), the Solid Waste Disposal Act, MAss. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 111, 5 150A (West 1981), and the Wetlands Protection Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
131, 5 40 (West 1981). In addition, the provisions of the Massachusetts Environmental Policy 
Act (MEPA), MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30, 5 62A (West 1981), were invoked to require the 
Trustees of the site to file an Environmental Notification Form regarding activities "which 
may cause significant damage to the environment." HAZARDOUS WASTES IN WOBURN, supra 
note 12, at 13-14. 
Three principal state agencies, the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, the 
Attorney General, and the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, have administered the 
state's enforcement of regulatory compliance at the site. The City of Woburn, the Town of 
Reading, and the Boston Edison Company intervened in the principal state suit against all the 
current owners of the site. The two municipalities were also included in the final state judg-
ment agreement with the Trustees of the Mark-Phillip Trust. [d. See also Memorandum of Law 
in Support of Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Dep't of Envt'l Quality Eng'g, Att'y Gen. of 
the Commw. of Mass. v. D'Annolfo, Mass. Sup. Ct., No. 22690. 
26. See, Memorandum in Opposition to Entry of Final Judgment, Dep't of Envt'l Quality 
Eng'g, Att'y Gen. of the Commw. of Mass., Town of Reading v. D' Annolfo, Mass. Sup. Ct., No. 
22690. 
At the local level, the Woburn Conservation Commission, Board of Health, and Board of 
Selectmen, as well as the Town of Reading, are involved in either litigation or regulatory ac-
tion concerning the site. The Woburn Conservation Commission administers in the locality 
those provisions of the Wetlands Protection Act which require a permit for dredging, filling, 
or altering any wetland. Following a public hearing, the commission may issue or disapprove 
an "Order For Conditions" for the work. Appeal is made to the state. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 131, S 40. The Woburn Board of Health holds the authority to close down the site if it is 
found to be a hazard to public health, safety or welfare, as well as to seek abatement of the 
odor as a public nuisance pursuant to the Massachusetts Clean Air Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 111, SS 142A-142I. In addition, the Woburn Board of Selectmen would handle citizen com-
plaints under mandamus. The Town of Reading can, and has sought abatement of the odor as a 
public nuisance pursuant to the Massachusetts Clean Air Act. HAZARDOUS WASTES IN WOBURN, 
supra note 12, at 13-14. 
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have taken such action as well. Nevertheless, these regulatory 
systems are not designed to provide compensatory relief to injured 
parties. Thus, independent of the public remedies instituted, private 
litigation has been started by some affected residents of the Woburn 
area for personal injury damages. 21 
B. Background: Legislation 
The Woburn hazardous waste incident is not atypical. Nationwide, 
the legal system is inadequate to provide compensation to victims in-
jured by exposure28 to hazardous wastes29 releasedso into the en-
vironment. No private party suffering from such an injury has suc-
27. On May 14, 1982, 23 plaintiffs representing the families of four Woburn children who 
died of leukemia and of two persons who have leukemia, brought suit in Massachusetts 
Superior Court against defendants Cryovac, Inc., W.R. Grace Company, Inc., John J. Riley 
Company, Inc., and Beatrice Foods, Inc. (plaintiffs also named XYZ Company as a presently 
unknown company or companies which may have contributed to the alleged grounds for liabili-
ty). Anderson, et al. v. Cryovac, Inc., No. 82-2444 (Mass. Sup. Ct. filed~May 14, 1982). Plain-
tiffs, citing four causes of action - negligence, wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, 
and nuisance - seek compensatory and punitive damages, and an injunction. 
Defendant Cryovac, Inc., is a division of the W.R. Grace Company and is doing business in 
East Woburn. The W. R. Grace Company is doing business in Massachusetts through Cryovac. 
Defendant John J. Riley Company, Inc., a division of Beatrice Foods, Inc., operates a tannery 
at the Woburn site. Beatrice Foods, Inc., is doing business in Massachusetts through the Riley 
Tannery. Beatrice Foods also owns an undeveloped site, bordering the Aberjona River, which 
has allegedly been used as a dump for chemical wastes. 
Plaintiffs allege that defendants deposited chemicals which contaminated the ground water 
in the area. Each plaintiff claims injury or the risk of injury due to direct exposure to the con-
taminated water supply. 
On petition for removal filed by defendants, the action was removed to the United States 
District Court for Massachusetts on grounds of diversity jurisdiction. (Copy of Petition For 
Removal Filed Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1446(e), Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., No. 82-2444 (Mass. 
Sup. Ct. fIled June 16, 1982). 
28. "Exposure," for purposes of this article, is not the occupational form which oc~urs sole-
ly in the workplace, but includes environmental exposure that occurs by living, working, or 
perhaps even traveling in the path of migration of hazardous waste. 
29. The term "hazardous wastes," as used in this article, refers to the incidental or inten-
tional hazardous by-products or the manufacture of toxic substances and products produced in 
the workplace and offered for sale or use in the marketplace. "Hazardous waste" does not in-
clude nuclear material from a nuclear accident, emissions from engine exhaust, or waste 
generated from the normal application of plant fertilizer. Hazardous waste may: 
A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in 
serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or 
B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment 
when improperly treated, stored, transported or disposed of or otherwise man-
aged. 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. SS 6901, 6903(5) (1976 & Supp. 
IV 1980). 
30. The term "release," means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, 
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment. 
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cessfully litigated a fully adjudicated law suit for compensatory 
damages.31 Neither the federal statutory structure enacted by Con-
gress,32 nor state statutory law33 creates a private cause of action for 
31. See SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION, supra note 7, at 497; Toxic Ills "No-Fault" 
Plan Urged, Washington Post, August 13, 1982, at C9; Lawyers to Ask Changes in Toxic 
Waste Suits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1982, at A20; SOUTIfWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
TOXIC WASTE SYMPOSIUM 1981 (Address by Barry Trilling, Trilling & Kennedy) [hereinafter 
cited as TOXIC WASTE SYMPOSIUM). 
In the Love Canal litigation, approximately $2.8 billion in private claims filed by victims 
against Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Hooker Chemical Corporation and the State of 
New York went uncompensated. See, Mervak v. City of Niagara Falls, 101 Misc.2d 68, 69, 420 
N.Y.S.2d 697, 698 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1979); Snyder v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics 
Corp., 104 Misc.2d 735 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1980). 
32. See Meyer, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims: RCRA Insurance and a Not So 
"Super" Fund Act, 11 ENVT'L L. 689 (1981). Existing federal statutes dealing with air and 
water pollution and statutes dealing with wastes are "regulatory," i.e., they seek to control 
the behavior of the polluter rather than to compensate the victims of polluting conduct. See, 
e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. S§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. 
SS 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 42 
U.S.C. SS 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
33. In an apparent misreading of state statutory law, some commentators have stated that 
many states now compensate private victims of hazardous waste exposure. See S. REP. No. 
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980); Hinds, Liability Under Federal Lawfor Hazardous Waste 
Injuries, 6 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 1 (1982). In fact, only the California "Superfund" bill has 
created a state fund to compensate persons injured by hazardous waste contamination. See in-
fra text and note at note 43. Further, the State of Alaska alone has expressly recognized a 
right of recovery in state court for personal damages suffered by private persons as a result of 
hazardous substance releases. Strict Liability for the Discharge of Hazardous Substances ch. 
122, S 1 (Alaska 1972); amend. ch. 260, S 13 (Alaska 1976). See Title 46, art. 7, sec. 46.03. 822 
(Alaska 1982). The statute creates a strict liability system under which persons injured by the 
"entry of a hazardous substance in or upon the waters, surface, or subsurface lands of the 
state" may bring suit for compensatory damages. Id. Potential damages include injury to per-
sons or property, loss of income, loss of the means of producing income, or the loss of an 
economic benefit. Id. ch. 122, § 1 (Alaska 1972). See id. S 46.03.824 (Damages). 
Despite the absence of the fault component in the required prima facie cause of action, vic-
tims are not guaranteed of recovery in state court; potential plaintiffs still must overcome 
other evidentiary and substantive obstacles implicit in personal injury hazardous waste litiga-
tion, including proof of causation and injury, and the statute of limitation problem. Id. 
The Massachusetts Citizen Suit statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, S 7A (West 1981) 
allows any group of 10 citizens of Massachusetts to enforce procedural and substantive re-
quirements of state and local environmental law by getting court injunctions or declaratory 
judgments. It is of no avail, however, in providing the basis for private damage actions for 
compensation of hazardous waste-related injuries. 
Florida legislation provides for remedial action and the payment of damages from pollution 
that arises from the transfer of certain materials between vessels or between vessels and the 
land. Pollutant Spill Prevention and Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. S 376.12 (Supp. 1981). The 
statute does apply to hazardous materials. The Florida law provides for private parties who 
have suffered damages to apply to the fund within six months after the cause of action arises. 
However, the state can, if good cause is shown, waive the statute of limitations. Id. S 376.12(2) 
(Supp. 1981). 
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a victim who suffers injury from hazardous waste. Furthermore, 
federal common law actions are likely to be of little or no avail. 34 
The lack of a victim liability clause in federal statutes prevents 
private parties from collecting damages for a statutory violation. 
Relevant federal statutes merely provide an aggrieved person with 
standing to sue for enforcement of federal regulations, and authorize 
governmental reimbursement of site cleanup costs incurred by 
private parties.36 The "Superfund" provisions of CERCLA, for in-
The New Jersey Spillage Compensation Fund provides for cleanup costs and property 
damage resulting from the discharge of hazardous substances on water or land. N. J. STAT. 
ANN. S 58:10·23.11a·z (West Supp. 1980). Compensation, however, does not include medical 
costs or loss of income, unless the loss of income is due to damage of real or personal property. 
Private claims against the fund must be made within one year after discovery, but no later 
than six years after the pollutant discharge originally occurred. 
New York law, similar to the New Jersey statute, is applicable only to discharges of 
petroleum. N.Y. NAV. LAW S 170·2·4 (McKinney Supp. 1980). 
Maine has also created a compensation fund. Maine Coastal Protection Fund, ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 38, SS 551·552 (1978 & Supp. 1979). The revenues are generated by license fees for oil 
transferred, penalties, and other fees and charges. Polluters are held strictly liable for the 
damages they cause. Private parties can collect from the fund for damages to real and personal 
property and for loss of income directly or indirectly caused by an oil discharge. 
Maryland has created the State Hazardous Substance Control Fund, Title 7, S 7·218·7·221 
(1982), MD. ANN. CODE ch. 240, S 2 (1982), which reimburses the Department of State Hazard· 
ous Substance Control Fund for the costs incurred in "cleanup, removal or mitigation of the ef· 
fect of any controlled hazardous substance that endangers the public health, safety or welfare; 
or endangers or damages natural resources." ld. The fund does not compensate private per· 
sons for damages or response costs resulting from the "effect" of hazardous substances. ld. 
New Hampshire has created the Hazardous Waste Cleanup Fund, ch. 147·B (1981) which 
subsidizes the State Bureau of Solid Waste Management in the containment, cleanup or 
removal of hazardous wastes or materials which have been improperly discharged, disposed of 
or spilled.ld. The fund does not pay compensation for private damage claims or the response 
costs incurred by any private person.ld. 
The North Carolina Oil Pollution Control Act of 1973, N.C. GEN. STAT. S 143.215.76 to 
143.215.94 (1978), restricts private damage recovery, including cleanup costs and damages to 
public resources, to the discharge of oil. ld. S 143. 215.93 . 94. 
A federal study has characterized these state statutes, limited as they are, as "exceptions to 
the general pattern of inaction which characterizes state response to this problem." IN· 
TERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS 
SUBSTANCES. THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT 27 (1979). A congressional study of compensation 
statutes in six states concluded that the "legal mechanisms in the states studied are generally 
inadequate for redressing toxic substances·related harms." SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSA· 
TlON. IJ'U,pra note 7, at 500 (Alabama, California, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey and Texas). 
34. Under existing case law, potential private litigants would be preempted by the federal 
statutory system if they sought to bring federal common law actions for hazardous waste in· 
juries. See City of Milwaukee v. lliinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. 
v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 463 U.S. 1 (1981). 
35. See e.g., 1980 Superfund Act, S 111(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2789, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. S 9601 (1980); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1857h·z, as amended by Clean 
Air Act amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. S 7401 (1978 & Supp. IV 1980); Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. S 1366(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. S 6972 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 40 
C.F.R. S 254 (1980). 
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stance, contain no provision compensating human victims of hazard-
ous waste pollution.86 While failing to provide an explicit compen-
satory right of action to private individuals, Superfund-like other 
relevant federal statutes-expressly preserves the private litigant's 
right to seek relief under existing state common law in state 
COurtS.87 The Superfund legislation does create a right of action, 
justiciable in federal court, for private and nonfederal plaintiffs to 
recover necessary "response" costs resulting from a release of 
hazardous substances.S8 This provision, however, only provides for 
compensation of limited response costs, specifically precluding 
money damages for medical expenses, property loss, and so-called 
health prophylactic damages. 39 
It is unlikely that the scope of existing statutory remedies will be 
expanded in the near future to include an administrative system for 
compensation of hazardous waste victims.40 Indeed, Congress has 
36. CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, And Liability Act) 
(Superfund) 42 U.S.C. SS 9601-9657 (1980); 38 CONGo Q. WEEKLY REP. 3435 (Nov. 29, 1980). 
Under RCRA, 42 U.S.C. SS 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), although private citizens may 
sue for response costs incurred in carrying out the Act's provisions, the Act does not provide 
victims of hazardous waste with a right of action for compensation. 
Like RCRA, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. SS 2601-2629 
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), does not provide individuals with a compensatory right of action. 
The Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (amending Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 33 U.S.C. SS 1251-1376 (1976», current version at 33 
U.S.C. SS 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), also fails to provide the hazardous waste victim 
with a private right of action to sue for compensation. 
The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. S 300f-j(10) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), does 
not provide victims of hazardous waste with a right of action for compensation. 
For a further discussion of pertinent environmental legislation enacted over the decade, see 
Trilling, "Potential For Harm" As The Enforcement Standard For Section 7009 of the 
Resource Conservation And Recovery Act, 2 U.C.L.A. J. ENVT'L L. 43 (1981). 
For a discussion of nonenvironmental federal statutes that may provide some form of relief 
to hazardous waste victims, see Trauberman, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances 
Pollution, 5 HARV. ENV'T L. REV. 1 (1981). 
37. 126 CONGo REC. S 14,974 (daily ed. Nov. 24,1980) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell). CERCLA 
(Superfund), Pub. L. No. 96-510, S 107(i)(j), 94 Stat. 2767, 2784 (1980). See Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. S 7604(e) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. S 6972(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1365(e) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), construed in City of Milwaukee 
V. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). See also Costle, Introduction, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 661 (1978); 
Skillern, Private Environmental Litigation: Some Problems and Pitfalls, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 
675, 685 (1978). 
38. CERCLA (Superfund) Title I (Hazardous Substances Releases, Liability, Com-
pensation), Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 111(aX2), 94 Stat. 2767, 2789 (1980). 
39. Id. S 111(dX2), 94 Stat. 2790. 
40. Provided with a national mandate to reduce the coverage of the federal regulatory 
system, the Reagan administration has cut regulations governing the disposal of hazardous 
wastes, preferring a "nonconfrontational" relationship with hazardous waste generators. See 
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been unable to pass legislation authorizing private citizens' suits for 
personal injuries due to hazardous waste exposure. Senator George 
Mitchell (D-Me.), on July 15, 1981, proposed amendments to the 
Superfund law which would allow victim compensation.41 The 
amendments, by establishing a private cause of action, would reim-
burse medical expenses incurred when persons are harmed by 
hazardous substances, and also would permit recovery for the costs 
of cleanup when natural resources are damaged by those same 
substances. 
The proposed amendments would also create a private cause of ac-
tion against the responsible party, but would do so without easing 
the obstacles inherent in maintaining the hazardous waste claim in 
court. The legislation is pending before the Senate Committee on 
Environmental and Public Works, and the prospects for passage 
through Congress appear dim, particularly in light of President 
Reagan's stated emphasis on limiting federal intervention into en-
vironmental disputes.42 Nor is it likely, should such legislation pass, 
that the Reagan Administration would increase the resources 
necessary to maintain a national compensation fund, either by levy-
ing an exclusive tax on the waste generating industry, or by increas-
ing the federal budget. 
The State of California alone has pioneered legislation authorizing 
compensation for a private injury caused by the release of hazardous 
waste. The Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Ac-
count Act of 1981,43 commonly known as the California Superfund, 
compensates persons under certain circumstances for all uninsured, 
out-of-pocket medical expenses and 80 percent of uninsured lost 
wages or business income for up to three years from the onset of 
treatment, for injuries proximately caused by exposure to the 
release of a hazardous substance. Actual lost wage recoveries are 
Shabecoff, Environmental Cases Off Sharply Under Reagan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1981; 
Bownstein, Armand Hammer: The 'Perfect' Man for the Job, Boston Globe, Nov. 7, 1981, at 
11; Justice's Special Waste Litigator Resigns, Citing 'Disastrous' EPA Enforcement Policy, 
[1981] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1027. See also Shabecoff, Witnesses Clash Over Rule on Burying of 
Toxic Waste, N.Y. Times, March 12, 1982, p. A12, col. 1; Poison at the EPA, New Republic, 
March 24,1982, p. 7. In fact, EPA's response to hazardous waste problems is "slowing" and 
the agency "can't maintain current levels of activities." 12 ERC 97 (May 15, 1981). 
41. S. 1486, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 2-6 (1981). The bill proposed amendments to CERCLA, 
Title I (Hazardous Substances Releases, Liability, Compensation), 42 U.S.C. 55 107(a), 
107(c)(i), 111(b), 101(6), 111(e)(2), 303 (1980). 
42. Trauberman, J. "Superfund - A Legal Update, 23 ENV'T 25 (1981). 
43. Ch. 756, 1981 Cal. Legis. Servo 2609, 2619-2620 (West) (to be codified at CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE 55 25186, 25300-25395). 
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limited to $15,000 per year for three years. There is also no recovery 
for claims which are the result of long-term exposure to ambient con-
centrations of air pollutants. As a precondition, a claimant must 
show either that the identity of the liable party is unknown or cannot 
be determined with reasonable diligence, or that there is no liable 
party, or that the liable party cannot satisfy the judgment. The ac-
count is funded by a tax imposed on the disposal of hazardous wastes 
in order to maintain an average annual balance of $10,000,000 in the 
fund. To date, other states have not followed California's example." 
The common law offers a potential alternative remedy to a federal 
and state statutory system which is unable to provide compensation 
to hazardous waste victims. This article suggests that the reason ag-
grieved parties do not initiate and cannot maintain private damage 
actions in state courts is that the prevailing legal standards of proof 
are nearly impossible to meet in the context of hazardous waste in-
juries. Most critically, the medical understanding of causation does 
not conform with the standards for judicial acceptance of legal 
causation. A valid scientific demonstration of causation may fre-
quently be insufficient to meet the quantum of proof required by tort 
law for a court to conclude that hazardous waste exposure has 
caused particular adverse health symptoms. Thus, a potential 
hazardous waste plaintiff who satisfies medical standards of injury 
and causation may still be unable to establish legal causation and, 
therefore, will suffer a directed verdict or ultimately fail to 'convince 
the jury to find in his favor. 
44. Id. See supra note 33. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts recently enacted legislation 
which mirrors the federal Superfund. Mass. H;R. 1503 (1983). Like Superfund, it does not 
authorize private victim compensation. The "Massachusetts Oil And Hazardous Material 
Release Prevention And Response Act" provides reimbursement for response costs - in-
curred by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) or 
any private party - resulting from the release or threat of release of oil or hazardous material. 
Recovery is limited to the reasonable costs of assessment, containment and removal of the 
waste. The bill also authorizes compensation for injury to natural resources and damages to 
real or personal property due to the release or threat of release. In addition, the legislation ap-
plies strict, joint and several liability to any party who caused or is legally responsible for the 
release or threat of release; section 5 of the bill specifically names hazardous waste site 
operators, transporters, disposers and generators as potential liable parties. In the case of 
multiple defendants, the bill expressly apportions response costs according to pro rata shares. 
It also subjects liable parties to treble damages. The bill directs DEQE to expend twenty-five 
million dollars to fulfill the reimbursement function of the program, funded by the sale of state 
notes and bonds. In addition to liability for response costs, the bill authorizes civil penalties for 
violation of provisions of the legislation. 
The state superfund program was enacted in March 24, 1983. See Mass. Senate OK's $B5m 
Cleanup Fund, Boston Globe, March 8, 1983, at 1,21; Mass. 'Superjv:nd'Signed Into Law, 
Boston Globe, March 25, 1983, at 1, 16. 
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This article proposes an adjustment in the evidentiary and substan-
tive burdens incurred by plaintiff and defendant in hazardous waste 
injury litigation. The objective of this proposal is to enable injured 
parties who bring suit for compensatory damages in state courts to 
overcome the principal obstacles to obtaining relief-obstacles which 
arise from the inability of current law to address hazardous waste 
problems rather than from the legal insignificance of such problems. 
This article will first describe the characteristics of hazardous waste 
injuries which make these injuries uniquely difficult to isolate and 
prove. The section will also analyze the methods medical scientists 
have developed to respond to the complexities of causation, latent 
manifestation of injuries, and the assessment of probabilities of risk 
from exposure. 
Second, this article will examine the legal problems faced by 
hazardous waste plaintiffs, including causation, proof of injury, and 
statutes of limitations. Third, this article will discuss the common 
law standard of probability adopted by some courts as an alternative 
to the rule of legal causation. Under this rule, a plaintiff must 
establish that a present injury was "more probably than not" caused 
by a particular act or material.45 Currently, most courts apply a "but 
for" standard of causation, under which the "defendant's conduct is 
not a cause of the event if the event would have occurred without 
it."46 Judicial solutions to the problem of "at-risk" injury-where no 
injury is yet manifest-will also be considered.47 As an indication of 
the need to allow compensation for at-risk injuries, a minority of 
courts have lessened the degree of probability of future harm that a 
plaintiff must show in order to obtain relief. Finally, this article will 
propose that, because of the unique problems involved in establishing 
the prima facie case of injury, certain evidentiary and substantive 
burdens borne by plaintiffs be altered and imposed on defendants. 
II. HAZARDOUS WASTE INJURIES: 
THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
Medical scientists have been unable to prove empirically that 
specific environmental pollutants directly cause particular health ef-
45. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS S 41, at 241 (4th ed. 1971); Estep, Radiation Injuries 
and Statistics: The Need For a New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 
274-275 (1960). 
46. W. PROSSER, supra note 45, S 41 at 238-39. 
47. The term "at-risk" injury, as used in this article, refers to the situation where human ex-
posure to hazardous waste has occurred but harm has not in fact been sustained. For a discus-
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fects. 48 In fact, it is the very nature of hazardous waste pollution-
related diseases that the causal links in the chain between exposure 
and injury are seriously attenuated.49 It is virtually impossible for 
scientists to identify the precise causes of environmental cancer. 50 
Not all persons exposed to chemical toxins or carcinogens will con-
tract disease or cancer. There is no method, medically or otherwise, 
to predict in advance which persons exposed to chemical pollutants 
will develop diseases.51 Moreover, scientists are unable to establish 
an absolutely "safe" level of human exposure to chemical car-
cinogens.52 Instead, most scientists agree that no human exposure to 
carcinogens is safe. 58 Thus, whether a resident living near a hazard-
ous waste site is drinking 267-parts-per-billion of trichloroethylene 
or 267 parts-per-million is immaterial-both levels may cause 
cancer, although higher concentrations of carcinogens may be more 
likely to cause cancer. 
This problem of epidemiological uncertainty54 is a result of the 
complex characteristics of hazardous waste injury in general. For ex-
ample, injuries may be latent, the "cause" of injury may be a product 
of multiple contributing factors, and the effects of hazardous waste 
exposure may vary among potential plaintiffs. Most hazardous waste 
injuries manifest themselves after long latency periods, following 
months or years of chronic or routine exposure to relatively low 
levels of chemical toxins. 55 At hazardous waste disposal sites where 
sion of "at-risk" injury in the context of the Agent Orange Product Liability cases see Brief for 
Plaintiffs-Respondents at 36-40, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, No. 
80-7079 (2d Cir. 1978). 
48. Davis, Cancer In The Workplace - The Case For Prevention, 23 ENV'T 29 (July/August 
1981). 
49. Senkan & Stauffer, The Difficulties of Defining Hazardous Wastes, 84 TECH. REV. 40 
(NovemberlDecember 1981). 
50. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF PuBLIC HEALTH, The Benefit of Reducing Risk (1979), cited in 
EpSTEIN, supra note 7, at 326. See also Environmental Carcinogenesis: Regulations on the 
Frontiers of Science, 7 ENVT'L L. 83, 94-96 (1976). Scientists have failed to attribute single 
cases of cancer to exposure to a single carcinogen. See Miller v. Nat'l Cabinet Co., 204 N.Y. 
Supp. 2d 129 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1960), Miller v. Olin Mathieson Chern. Corp., 398 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 
1966); Small Gaffing About A Thing Called Cause, 31 TEX. L. REV. 630 (1953). 
51. S. EpSTEIN, supra note 7, at 296. 
52. B. BROWN, supra note 3, at 119; REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 4, at 5. 
53. S. EpSTEIN, supra note 7, at 3. 
54. See Kennedy, The Politics of Preventive Health, 84 TECH. REV. 58 (NovemberlDecember 
1981). "We are terribly good ... at finding small amounts of something we think may be 
dangerous, but we are terribly bad at whether it is in fact dangerous, and even worse at 
estimating how dangerous it might be." Id. at 59. 
55. S. EpSTEIN, supra note 7, at 296. "Chronically toxic compounds can take 15 to 20 years 
or longer to produce adverse health effects," after exposure. Senkan & Stauffer, supra note 
49, at 40. 
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toxic chemicals and carcinogens have entered the atmosphere and 
the ground or drinking water, an individual's initial contact with con-
taminants may not produce any injurious effect. Thus, an individual 
may be exposed to chemical toxins or carcinogens without ever 
knowing it or having an opportunity to discover it in the exercise of 
the utmost diligence. Rather, the onset of physical or mental illness 
may not occur until after substantial quantities of contaminants have 
been ingested or otherwise encountered over time.56 Even after ex-
posure to medically dangerous levels of contamination, symptoms of 
disease may develop slowly and may be difficult to identify at their 
early stages. 57 In fact, an individual exposed to hazardous waste con-
taminants may lead a normal, healthy life for years without apparent 
physical damage and then suddenly experience visible effects from 
the chemical exposure. 
Contamination of the environment from carcinogens occurs well 
before cancer becomes evident in man. 58 Epidemiological studies in-
dicate that carcinogenic disease may take fifteen to twenty years to 
develop. 59 This long latency period demonstrates that hazardous 
waste-induced cancer can develop in humans well after the causative 
agent or group of agents has been released into a residential com-
munity and, perhaps, even after the waste has been removed from 
the environment.6o 
Further compounding the problem of understanding and proving 
hazardous waste injuries is the fact that most hazardous waste-
related diseases and cancers have no single cause.61 Injured parties 
are faced with the "immense, possibly insurmountable, scientific 
problem of proving causation where there are multiple" exposures to 
a wide variety of chemicals released into the environment which may 
cause cancer alone or in combination with other pollutants or natural 
elements. 62 
The phenomenon of multiple intervening causes can also be at-
tributed to the fact that at each stage of a chemical's migratory 
56. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY Environmental Quality 1979, The Tenth Annual 
Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 194-230 (1979). 
57.Id. 
58. Statement of Dr. Umberto Saffiotti, National Cancer Institute, former Director for Car-
cinogenesis, in THE CANCER CONNECTION 60 (1979). 
59. S. EpSTEIN. supra note 7. 
60.Id. 
61. DIY. OF LABORATORIES AND EPIDEMIOLOGY. NEW JERSEY STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH. AN 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC INvESTIGATION OF CLUSTERS OF LEUKEMIA AND HODGKINS DISEASE IN RUTHER-
FORD. NEW JERSEY 17 (1979). 
62. Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to Do While Waitingfor Washington, 5 HARV. 
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pathway to the victim-whether through ground water or the at-
mosphere, food or skin contact-chemical transformation, dilution, 
and recombination with other new compounds may occur. 68 This 
process creates a wide variety of contaminants to which the victim 
may be exposed, preventing the identification of a single responsible 
pollutant.64 The complexity of causation is even more problematic in 
cases where a person's health may be influenced by factors beyond 
the association with the nearby waste site or ambient exposure. 
These factors include diet, smoking, genetic predispositions, age, 
and prior exposure to chemicals.65 
The human effects of exposure to hazardous waste are diverse, 
complicated, and difficult to assess. Effects of exposure may involve 
all the human organ systems.66 The responses which a single con-
taminant can produce after ingestion, inhalation, or direct skin con-
tact may vary in time and effect from individual to individual, mak-
ing it difficult to attribute a particular illness to a specific chemical or 
combination of chemicals.67 
One last set of factors unique to hazardous waste injury claims is 
the problem of finding a responsible and solvent defendant. Poten-
tially liable parties can range from chemical manufacturers and the 
producers of the chemical by-product, to transporters and disposers. 
This involvement of multiple participants in the hazardous waste 
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 32 (1970). 
The multiple environmental exposures to hazardous waste can result from a variety of 
events, including wind-borne spread, water runoff, underground seepage, migration to the 
surface of chemical liquids by capillary action, or migration of chemicals under schools, houses, 
community, and commercial structures. SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW TOXIC 
WASTE SYMPOSIUM 1981 (Address by Ira Monson, Chief Medical Officer, CAL-OSHA). 
63. Soble, A Proposal JOT the Administrative Compensation oj Victims oj Towic Substances 
PoUution: A Model Act, 14 HARv. J. LEGIS. 683,738 (1977). 
64. For the potential plaintiff to avoid the problem of isolating the responsible contaminant, 
the party must identify the so-called "background" concentration of chemicals in ground 
water, surface water, and in the air and soil. Such a background analysis will facilitate iden-
tification of the causative agents. TOXIC WASTE SYMPOSIUM (address by Jeffrey Driver, General 
Council, Waste Management Corp., Inc.). 
65. These are known as "symptom-modifying" factors. Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law 
Liability FOT Tozic TOTts: A Phantom R61Mdy, 9 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW 859, 922 (1981). 
Hazardous waste victims may be tobacco users or workers in a chemical plant or waste site. 
66. TOXIC WASTE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 62, at 30 (address by Ira Monson, Chief Med. Of-
fieer, CAL-OSHA). Chemie8Js may contain carcinogens, brain and other nervous system tox-
ins, agents that sear the lungs preventing breathing, mutation causing chemicals increasing 
the number of sterilizing agents that sterilize both males and females. Poisonous chemicals 
may also cause - not exclusively - miscarriages, stillbirths, poisoning of fetuses and birth 
defects.ld. See also NAT'L WILDLIFE FEDERATION, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES DILEMMA 1 (1980). 
67. Soble, supra note 63, at 738. 
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generation chain may impede the identification of a defendant even 
by the use of a manifest system.68 Of course, assuming that a defend-
ant party is discovered, there is no guarantee that the party will be 
found liable. 
Site owners may also avoid responsibility for hazardous waste in-
jury. In some instances, the site owner may have purchased the land-
fill property subsequent to the period of waste disposal and may be 
unconnected with the past waste generation and dumping activities. 
Further, the owner may be unaware that his property contains 
hazardous waste. In short, mere ownership of hazardous waste 
dumpsites, without unreasonable conduct, does not by itself confer 
liability for pollution generated by third parties. Even if the owners 
of the disposal site are responsible for the contamination and the 
resulting injury, as private residents or small businessmen they may 
be incapable of meeting substantial damages judgments. This is not 
the case in Woburn, where the site owners' activities can be linked 
directly to the contamination of the surrounding environment. In ad-
dition, as successful real estate developers, the owners apparently 
are solvent to meet the burden of paying money damages. 
Due to the myriad of human effects that may result from hazard-
ous waste contamination, it is difficult to classify persons injured by 
releases from a disposal site or other source. A list of potential 
claimants in Woburn, for example, would include a broad spectrum 
of people who have been exposed in several ways to a wide range of 
substances which may have caused a variety of both ascertainable 
and unascertainable injuries. This can be attributed to the multiple 
environmental exposures that residents have undergone: they may 
have ingested contaminated water; inhaled polluted air; or come into 
contact with wastes in contaminated soil or at the site itself. In addi-
68. Congress created a comprehensive manifest system with the passage of RCRA under 
which all generators, transporters, and disposers of hazardous substances must keep detailed 
records of hazardous substance storage. 43 U.S.C. SS 6922-6924 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
Under the permit system enacted, each owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal 
facility is required to apply for and obtain a permit to operate the facility. [d. S 6925(a). RCRA 
authorizes the EPA to promulgate regulations requiring record keeping, labeling, use of ap-
propriate containers, reporting, and use of "manifests" to assure that the management of 
hazardous waste is brought within regulatory compliance. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,139, 33,142-48 
(1980) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. S 262) (standards applicable to generators of hazardous 
waste). The manifest document itself must contain information about both the generator and 
the hazardous waste, and must be shipped with the waste. 45 Fed. Reg. at 33,143. Once the 
waste is with the disposer, the information must be verified and a copy of the manifest must be 
retained for at least three years. [d. at 33,226, 33,238 (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. SS 
264.70-264.77, 265.70-265.77). 
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tion, some injuries may be acute and become immediately apparent 
to the victim, while others may be latent and time-delayed.69 
Claimants with unascertainable injuries are also endangered by 
the Woburn contamination due to the risk of suffering future harm. 
Those residents who have been exposed to the toxic substances may 
have incurred nonidentifIable injuries with extended latency periods. 
Potential victims may include residents who live near the site, per-
sons not in proximity who have nevertheless been exposed to the en-
vironmental contaminants, and the workers involved in the cleanup 
of the site and the construction of a commercial park on the dumpsite 
land. 70 
The characteristics of hazardous waste injury make it nearly im-
possible to prove the causal link between exposure and specifIc ill 
health effects. The causal uncertainty of injury may be a product of 
multiple causes and the attendant variety of human health effects, 
the long latency periods for manifestation of disease symptoms, and 
the fact that exposures are diffIcult to reconstruct. In addition, the 
diverse number of activities and parties potentially responsible for 
any given pollution exposure incident make proof of a causal connec-
tion even more problematic. 
Medical scientists have acknowledged the need to isolate and ex-
amine epidemiological cause-effect relationships despite the ex-
istence of causal uncertainty. While science ultimately seeks to 
demonstrate a precise "fIt" or cause-effect link between events, 
scientifIc analysis proceeds on the basis of experimentation, refor-
mulation, and inherent uncertainty. Indeed, scientists often quantify 
the degree of uncertainty in a given epidemiological study in order to 
assess its overall accuracy. Thus, a scientist's "proof" is often ten-
tative, since it contains inherent uncertainties; yet such proof may 
represent our best understanding of disease-exposure causation.71 
While the legal approach to cause-effect appears to be similarly 
logical, it cannot tolerate causal uncertainty as the scientifIc method 
69. See Baurer, L01Je Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVT'L L. 
133 (1980); Hanley, Proof of Causation in Environmental Litigation, in TOXIC TORTS 403 (p. 
Rheingold, N. Landaue & R. Canavan eds. 1977). 
70. See, e.g., Boston Globe, Jan. 8, 1983, at B2 (photograph showing EPA technician work-
ing at waste cite clad in full body protective suit and respirator helmet while unprotected 
residents stood nearby, dressed in civilian clothes, watching the work). 
71. See NAT'L WILDLIFE FEDERATION, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES DILEMMA (1980); THE ORIGINS 
OF HUMAN CANCER 7-8, 751-59 (H. Hiatt, J. Watson & J. Winsten eds. 1978); McGarity, 
Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Ques-
tions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. REV. 729 (1979); Large & 
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does; courts, after all, must decide cases. 72 The next sections explore 
the conflicting approaches of science and law to hazardous waste in-
jury causation. 
III. METHODOLOGIES OF CAUSATION PROOF 
A. The Scientific Approach to Causation 
To diagnose environmental disease, some scientists use a conven-
tional model of biological causation.73 At the outset, under the model, 
acute or potentially substantial injury must be demonstrated. Sec-
ond, the scientist must identify the hazardous materials in question 
in the environment. Third, it must be established that the materials 
actually cause disease or pose significant health risks to man. The 
toxicity or carcinogenic nature of the waste materials can be sug-
gested from studies evidencing the appropriate long-term adverse 
health effects in laboratory animals. 74 Lastly, human exposure to the 
relevant materials can be demonstrated by proving proximity to the 
hazardous waste site or direct physical contact with the leaked 
pollutants, including ingestion, inhalation or surface contact with the 
chemical wastes. 76 
The criteria for proving medical causation are as follow: 
1) Prevalence of the disease should be significantly higher among 
those exposed to the putative cause than in case control subjects not 
exposed. Thus, to prove the substantiality of the injury, the 
prevalence of the disease should be greater among the persons ex-
posed than the total level of disease among the control subjects not 
exposed. 
2) Exposure to the putative cause should be present more often in 
those persons diagnosed with the disease than in the control cases 
without the disease. 
Michie, Proving that the Strength of the British Navy Depends on the Number of Old Maids in 
England: A Comparison of Scientific Proof With Legal Prooj, 11 ENVT'LL. 555, 563-68 (1981). 
72. Large & Michie, supra note 71, at 581-86; Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's 
View, 5 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 209 (1981). 
73. While there is no historic precedent for a universally recognized causation model, fun-
damental criteria for proof of causation have been developed. See Evans, Causation and 
Disease: Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 YALE J. BIO. & MED. 175-95 (1976). 
74. The carcinogenic and toxic character of materials in humans can only be detected by 
long-term, sophisticated biological testing. Interview with Dr. Brown, supra note 6. 
75. There are very few tests available to measure the degree of contact and absorption of 
chemicals into the human body. Thus, quantified estimates of exposure to chemicals with 
adverse effects will satisfy the preconditions of the model. Of course, possibilities of human ex-
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3) Incidence of the disease should be significantly higher in those 
persons exposed to the putative cause than in those not exposed. 
4) Temporally, manifestation of the disease should follow exposure 
to the causal agent according to a wide distribution of incubation 
periods along a bell-shaped curve. 
5) A spectrum of responses from exposure to the causal agent 
should be distributed among a logical biological spectrum ranging 
from mild to severe. 
6) Measurable host response: once exposure occurs, the person who 
becomes a host of the causal agent must show a measurable response 
to that agent. 76 
This scientific approach to proving causation fails to recognize the 
medical reality that there are few, if any, measurable human 
responses to the exposure to hazardous waste sites.77 Medical 
science's inability to measure the effects of human exposure to 
hazardous waste can be attributed to a number of factors. They in-
clude the general lack of medical understanding of hazardous waste 
injury, the fact that symptoms of exposure to hazardous waste may 
be masked by the appearance of other illnesses, and the fact that 
hazardous chemicals affect persons in conjunction with a multitude 
of other factors.78 In order to satisfy the rigorous criteria of the 
causation model, scientists rely on laboratory animal studies of 
single pollutants under highly controlled conditions.79 Although a 
chemical's toxicity or carcinogenic character can be gauged by its ef-
fect on a laboratory animal,80 the validity of inferring human causa-
tion from animal responses has been questioned. 81 
posure must be based at the outset on documentation of the leakage of hazardous wastes into 
the environment. [d. 
76. Evans, supra note 73, at 175-95. 
77. Interview with Dr. Brown, supra note 6. 
78. [d. 
79. Davis, supra note 48, at 27. 
80. B. BROWN, supra note 3, at 119. 
[P]roof that a substance, which has been recognized as carcinogenic in animals, ac-
tually causes cancer would require, in most cases extremely complex and lengthy 
epidemiologic studies .... Therefore, the only prudent course of action at the present 
state of our knowledge is to assume that chemicals which are carcinogenic in animals 
could also be in man, although the direct demonstration in man is lacking. Saffiotti, 
supra note 58, at 60. 
81. The studies are questionable due to the fact that there are differences in the actions of 
chemical residues on animals as distinguished from humans. "The human population is dif-
ferent •... The mouse (or rat) doesn't smoke or breathe hydrocarbons or sulfur oxides from 
fossil fuels, doesn't drink, doesn't take medicine, doesn't eat bacon or smoked salmon." D. 
RaIl, ThnJ8I&old1, in ENVT'L HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 22, 164-166 (1978). 
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Although it is "practically impossible"to prove that a single case of 
hazardous waste disease was caused by a single pollutant which 
migrated from a dumpsite,82 some medical scientists have been will-
ing to infer causation when an "association" can be demonstrated 
between exposure to the hazardous chemicals and higher rates of 
morbidity and mortality.8s In Woburn, scientists, rather than show a 
cause-effect relationship, have sought to establish a "possible 
association" or "statistically significant correlation" between the 
death and disease patterns and proximity to the waste site or other 
environmental exposures to the contamination. 84 
Due to the complexities of causation and latent manifestation of in-
juries associated with hazardous waste epidemiology, medical scien-
tists have also been willing to construe mere human exposure to 
hazardous waste as a substantial harm by itself, without proof of ac-
tual injury. 85 This departure from the conventional notion of injury is 
an outgrowth of the prevailing logic in the medical community that 
exposure to a toxic substance or carcinogen increases the risk of 
developing certain types of illness.86 The process of evaluating the 
risk of a particular chemical, known as risk assessment, is based on 
probability theory which quantifies the likelihood that exposure to a 
particular hazardous substance will increase the propensity for 
disease. Probability theory is also applied by some courts to deter-
mine the likelihood that a substance caused a particular injury in a 
given case.87 
According to medical scientists, before risk assessment can be con-
ducted two critical components must be satisfied. First, the toxicity 
of the substance must be measured and, second, the extent of human 
exposure to the substance must be established.88 The apparent rigor 
82. Interview with Dr. Edward L. Baker, Assistant Professor of Occupational Medicine, 
Harvard University School of Public Health (Jan. 4, 1982). 
83. Interview with Dr. Brown, supra note 6. 
84. Such a project is being conducted by the Harvard University School of Public Health in 
conjunction with a Woburn citizens group, For A Cleaner Environment. The community 
health survey will also attempt to confirm assumptions that the morbidity and mortality rates 
in Woburn are higher than the rates in other communities. [d. See supra text and note at note 
20. 
85. Interview with Dr. Baker, supra note 82. 
86. Interview with Dr. Brown, supra note 6. 
87. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974); Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 
498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 1ll.2d I, 426 
N.E.2d 824 (1981); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services Inc., 77 lll. App.3d 618, 396 N.E.2d 
552 (1979); Carolina Envt'l Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
88. Kennedy, supra note 54, at 60. 
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of these criteria is mollified in application, however, in consideration 
of the reality that most hazardous waste victims are exposed to a 
variety of toxic substances and carcinogens, resulting in a variety of 
effects which are difficult to categorize exclusively. 
The methodology for assessing risks of environmental disease due 
to exposure to hazardous waste is based primarily on chi-square 
analysis, a standard statistical tool employed by scientists.89 It is a 
probability test that determines the likelihood of error in making a 
statistically significant correlation between health effects and ex-
posure to hazardous chemical waste. The analysis determines what 
the likelihood is that a cluster of leukemia cases, for example, may 
have resulted purely by chance. "Statistical significance" is 
established if there is less than a 3 or 5 percent chance that the 
exposure-disease association established could be accidental. 90 If, 
however, the likelihood of error exceeds 3 or 5 percent, the causal 
connection would be considered a random chance occurrence. 
In Woburn, for example, if it can be demonstrated that for every 
100 epidemiological surveys conducted, ninety-seven show an abnor-
mally high rate of disease in exposed residents, the statistical 
likelihood of random chance would be overcome. Thus, although no 
absolute cause for the high rate of disease and death in Woburn 
would be identified, a statistically significant association between 
disease and waste exposure would be made which could satisfy scien-
tific standards of probability. 
Despite this apparently flexible methodology, the uncertainty sur-
rounding current scientific data on hazardous wastes makes an 
understanding of causation exceedingly difficult. The problem of 
establishing causation between exposure to hazardous waste pollu-
tion and injury is illustrated by the Woburn hazardous waste site in-
89. The chi-square test is in fact a variation of the medical requirement that epidemiological 
tests must be "valid," that is, that tests measure what they purport to measure, and 
"reliable," that is, that the same results will be obtained each time. Interview with Dr. Brown, 
supra note 6. For a complete discussion of the chi-square test, see, H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL 
STATISTICS 212-28 (1960). 
90. Variations of the chi-square probability of error test run from probability limits of 1 per-
cent or less and 3 percent to 5 percent. 
Biologists have accepted a convention that if there is no more than a one-in-twenty 
chance that the result is not due to the experimental variable, then the result is 
significant. But only when pressed to give full details does a biologist usually bother 
to point out that a set of confidence limits has been arbitrarily chosen .... 
After all, there is nothing magic about one in twenty or any other number we use to 
establish the significance of a result. 
Kennedy, supra note 54, at 59-60. 
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cident. Public officials have been unable to determine the exact ex-
tent and potential for environmental contamination and human ex-
posure to the known carcinogens and toxins released from the site.91 
No study has identified the precise number and volume of hazardous 
chemicals existing at the site.92 Indeed, large portions of the site 
have never been tested, and it is as yet unknown what hazardous 
wastes they may contain.93 Nor has the migratory pathway of ex-
posure that the pollutants have traveled from the site been 
reconstructed.94 Medical scientists have been unable to link con-
clusively the health problems in the community with proximity to the 
site or use of the contaminated municipal water wells.96 Despite the 
apparent cancer microepidemic in East Woburn, no study has 
definitely identified a causal connection between the death and 
disease patterns and the hazardous wastes.96 
91. "This is not a Love Canal. We have no evidence that what is in the wells is from the 
hazardous waste site. We do not know that the source ofthe TCE in the wells is the site." In-
terview with Rev. Bruce Young, supra note 23. 
According to Rick Leighton, environmental engineer and Woburn coordinator, EPA: "Peo-
ple should realize, we may never be able to tell what contaminated wells G and H." 
Schlapowsky, supra note 24, at 13. 
The EPA has issued a study on the quality of ground water in eastern and northen Woburn 
to help determine the possible extent of contamination of the water supply. The study in-
dicates the presence of 42 organic and inorganic chemicals included on the EPA list of 129 
Priority Pollutants. The presence of the chemical contaminants in the ground water, according 
to the EPA study, raises the distinct possibility that drinking water from the aquifer may have 
been contaminated in the past or may become contaminated in the future. The report also 
sought to identify the potential sources of contamination from leaching of surface deposits at 
the site. Ecology and Environment, Inc., Interim Report on the Ground Water Quality of East 
and North Woburn, Massachusetts, EPA FIT PROJECT TDD No. Fl-8010-04B (May 6,1981). 
92. Interview with Rev. Bruce Young, supra note 23. See also HAZARDOUS WASTES IN 
WOBURN, supra note 12, at 11. 
93. HAZARDOUS WASTES IN WOBURN, supra note 12, at 11. 
94. As a recent study noted: 
The site is mostly wetlands and a recharge area, making it especially conducive to 
spreading the contaminants. Although the threat seems to be primarily one of the 
future, more testing is needed ... to determine what the extent of this threat is .... 
It has been claimed that this site is not another Love Canal because most of the 
chemicals found here are heavy metals that don't easily dissolve, while the substances 
at Love Canal were more transportable. However, this may be a premature conclu-
sion. The danger posed by the hides is not limited to leaching of the metals which they 
contain. Additional dangers include organic and microbial contamination of water and 
prolonged exposure to air pollutants. Also, there may be many other chemicals pres-
ent which have not yet been tested; some of these may be a more immediate threat. 
HAZARDOUS WASTES IN WOBURN, supra note 12, at 36-37 (emphasis in original). 
95. "The fact that we have not found a connection between the toxins and the elevated ill 
health patterns and the concentration of childhood cancer does not mean there is no correla-
tion. It is more a reflection of our collective ignorance. No correlation can be proved con-
clusively." Interview with Dr. Brown, supra note 6. 
96. A state DPH study has gone so far as to state that the contamination of municipal wells 
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In view of the causal uncertainty surrounding the death and 
disease patterns in East Woburn, residents who wish to start private 
damage actions must establish the grounds for making a valid 
association between an injury and waste exposure. They must first 
identify all sources of hazardous waste on the site. Second, the par-
ties must establish the scope of environmental contamination and the 
migration of the pollutants through. identification of baseline am-
bient air, water, and soil quality, and identification of ground water 
and other conduits from the site which transport hazardous 
substances away from the site to outlying areas. Third, potential 
plaintiffs must attempt to document the extent of human exposure 
to the released substances and assess the likely effects on human 
health for the particular types of exposure. Finally, the residents 
must assess the actual impact of the hazardous wastes on the health 
and environment of the community. The potential plaintiff is not 
helped much by risk assessment methodology unless there is reliable 
baseline data to plug into the analysis. 
In summary, the Woburn hazardous waste incident illustrates the 
critical environmental and health consequences of dumping hazard-
ous wastes near residential communities. In Woburn, some nearby 
residents and public health scientists believe that injuries have oc-
G and H did not cause East Woburn's high rate of childhood leukemia. According to DPH Ass't 
Comm'r of Envt'l Health, Gerald S. Parker, the study's findings, based on death records 
dating back to 1949, indicate that the rate of childhood leukemia began to climb in the early 
1960's before the two wells began pumping in 1964 and 1968. "Our findings did not support an 
association between the wells and the incidence of childhood leukemia in East Woburn," 
Parker said. Parker, though, did qualify his conclusions, stating that "the data accumulated on 
childhood leukemia mortality rates precludes any strong statistical conclusions." MAss. DEP'T 
OF PuBLIC HEALTH, CANCER MORTALITY IN WOBURN: A THREE DECADE STUDY 1949-1978 (Nov. 
17,1981). 
The DPH study has been disputed by various local community leaders and public health 
scientists, who argue that the seven childhood leukemia deaths occurred in households that 
were drinking water from the subsequently closed water wells as well as the aquifer running 
below the site. They claim that the clustering of the childhood leukemia cases around the area 
that used wells G and H is not mere coincidence. 
We question the accuracy and validity of the study. It is more political than medical. 
The findings are so inconclusive that the state could not possibly prove or disprove 
the correlation between the water and the leukemia. The most any study with hard 
evidence can show is an association, not a cause and effect. 
Interview with Rev. Bruce Young, 81I.pra note 23. 
Scientifically, the DPH study is not valid. There is absolutely no evidence one way 
or the other to conclude that the quality of the water was the vehicle by which the 
children were exposed to the carcinogenic or toxic chemicals generally. However, 
once the wells opened, the concentration of cancer did develop in subsequent years. 
Both the actual cases and the overall rates were significantly greater. 
Interview with Dr. Brown, 81I.pra note 6. 
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curred and that the hazardous contaminants are the reason. While 
high rates of cancer and leukemia do afflict the surrounding area, 
the causes have yet to be proven. Although there has been some 
federal, state, and local cleanup response to the pollution, injured 
parties remain uncompensated. Inevitably, potential claimants have 
brought and will continue to bring suits for private damages in state 
court. 
It has been shown that in response to the general problem of causal 
uncertainty, scientists have moved from conventional direct causa-
tion theory to probabilities of causation and risk assessment, where-
by reasoned inferences are drawn from statistical likelihoods that an 
association between events (exposure to hazardous waste and dis-
ease from exposure) is causal. In the next section, the legal approach 
to causation will be examined. This article will suggest that the 
standards of tort law make it virtually impossible for hazardous 
waste plaintiffs to recover damages. It will also discuss how the in-
terrelation of science and law further obstructs plaintiffs from prop-
erly establishing causation so as to prevent compensation for injuries 
from exposure to hazardous wastes. 
B. Proof of Legal Causation 
The common law firmly places the burden of proving legal causa-
tion on the plaintiff.97 To prove legal causation, the plaintiff, at the 
outset, must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence98 that 
the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor" in causing the 
alleged injury.99 In sum, the plaintiff must establish a cause-in-fact 
connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury.100 To 
recover damages in a hazardous waste injury suit, the victim also 
bears the heavy burden of proving that a particular exposure to an 
identified agent "directly" caused the specific claimed injury.101 
The required causal connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the plaintiffs injury cannot be met by a showing of a "mere 
97. SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION, supra note 7, at 488. 
98. W. PROSSER, supra note 45, S 38, at 208. 
99. Id., S 41, at 240; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 431, at 428 (1965). See also Hamil v. 
Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 364 A.2d 1366 (1976), averruling Hamil v. Bashline, 224 Pa. 
Super. 407, 307 A.2d 57 (1973), allocatur denied 224 Pa. Super. xxxvi 407 (1973). Some courts 
use the "but for" rule of causation, a more extreme rule of exclusion. W. PROSSER, supra note 
45, S 38 at 208. 
100. Id., S 41 at 236-37. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 99, SS 
430-453. 
101. W. PRosSER, supra note 45, S 43, at 263-64. 
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possibility" of causation, even though such showing is scientifically 
supportable.102 Nor is it legally sufficient for the plaintiff to provide 
evidence that exposure to the environmental contaminant increased 
the risk of suffering harm. lOS If the plaintiff's argument on the issue 
of causation is built on speculation or conjecture, the court will direct 
a verdict for the defendant,104 a result mandated by established case 
law and consistent with fundamental tort law principles. Therefore, 
to establish legal causation, plaintiff may introduce expert testimony 
based only on "reasonable medical certainty" that the injury in ques-
tion was caused by defendant's acts or omissions. lOS A medical opin-
ion of a "possibility" of causation or an increased risk of harm is in-
sufficient for a jury to find causation.106 
To prove a causal link between the agents released from the 
hazardous waste site and the injury at issue, the plaintiff must fulfill 
four essential conditions of the traditional approach to legal causa-
tion.107 First, the plaintiff must substantiate the presence of signifi-
cant amounts of the pollutant which is alleged to have caused the in-
jury. Second, the plaintiff must reconstruct the manner in which the 
exposure occurred by tracing the path of contaminant migration 
from the waste site to the victim. lOS Third, the plaintiff must identify 
the source of the contamination and show a breach of due care by the 
defendant. Fourth, the plaintiff must demonstrate the effect of the 
pollutant in question on the injured person. 
In the typical hazardous waste pollution incident, where numerous 
possible contaminants may exist in an uncontrolled environment, it 
would be an unreasonable burden to require the victims of con-
tamination to prove that one contaminant is the cause of particular 
symptoms. Indeed, the possible existence of other contaminants 
necessarily creates doubt that the contaminant in question caused 
the injury. Similarly, the possible existence of so many contaminants 
102. Id., S 43, at 242. See Large & Michie, supra note 71, at 591-614. 
103. Hamil v. Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 364 A.2d 1366, 1369-70 (1976). 
104. W. PROSSER. supra note 45, § 43, at 242-43. See also McMahon v. Young, 442 Pa. 484, 
276 A.2d 534 (1971). 
105. Hamil v. Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 364 A.2d 1366 (1976). 
106. 243 Pa. Super. at 230, 364 A.2d at 1369. See also Houston v. Canon Bowl, Inc., 443 Pa. 
383, 386, 278 A.2d 908, 910 (1971); Niggel v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 219 Pa. Super. 353, 281 
A.2d 718 (1971); McMahon v. Young, 442 Pa. 484, 276 A.2d 534 (1971). 
107. Derived from Soble, supra note 63, at 706, 739. 
108. The fact that the level of chemical pollutants in the ground water, soil or air decreased 
directly as the distance from a given waste site increased may be a sufficient demonstration of 
chemical migration from the dumpsite in question. See TOXIC WASTE SYMPOSIUM. supra note 62 
(address by Ira Monson). 
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in an uncontrolled setting makes it impossible to determine with 
exactitude the precise contribution of each contaminant to particular 
symptoms. Thus, regardless of the common law theory of liability a 
hazardous waste victim may invoke,109 proof of legal causation is the 
paramount obstacle to recovery of compensatory damages.11o Even 
109. A number of commentators have discussed the difficulties inherent in using traditional 
common law theories of recovery to remedy hazardous waste-related injuries. See, e.g., 
Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 65, at 859; Baurer, LQVe Canal: Common Law Approaches To A 
Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVT'L L. 133 (Fall 1980); Honabach, Toxic Torts: Is Strict Liability 
Really the "Fair and Just" Way to Compensate the Victims, HAZARDOUS WASTE CONFERENCE, 
ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER, VERMONT LAW SCHOOL (1980); Note, HAZARDOUS WASTES: PRESERV-
ING THE NmSANCE REMEDY, 33 STAN. L. REV. 675 (1981); Comment, A Private Nuisance Ap-
proach to Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 7 OHIO N .. U.L. REV. 86 (1980); Note, Transporta-
tion of Hazardous Materials, 5 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 345 (1981); Note, Strict Liability for 
Generators, Transporters and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949 (1980); 
Note, Liability for Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 69 GEO. L. J. 1047 (1981); Note, Strict Liability And Hazardus Wastes, 16 N.E. 
L. REV. (1981). 
110. "The problem of causation - where it involved exposure to a small population and was 
likely to involve conflicting testimony from expert witnesses - and who to sue, prevented us 
from pursuing legal action." Interview with Rev. Bruce Young, supra note 22. 
Indeed, when suit was,later brought, see supra note 26, named defendant Beatrice Foods 
Co. and its division, the John J. Riley Co., predictably answered plaintiffs' complaint with the 
defense, among many, that its acts or omissions "were neither the cause in fact nor the legal 
cause of any alleged introduction of materials into the environment." Answer of Defendant at 
17, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., No. 82-1672-S (D. Mass. filed July 6, 1982). Instead, Beatrice 
Foods Co. asserted that the intervening acts of third parties, over whom it has no control, 
were the cause of the alleged injuries. Id. 
As a further deterrent to suit for hazardous waste injury, judges and juries may be unable to 
reconcile the incongruities between competing health surveys, or the equally technical and 
complex evidence provided by defendants as rebuttal evidence. Here, the trier offact is forced 
to analyze information in fields far removed from lay competence, and must make decisions 
based on conflicting and ambiguous data. Such highly technical scientific issues may transcend 
the reach of the courts. David L. Bazelon, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, is a leading commentator on this problem. See Bazelon, Risk and Respon-
sibility, 205 SCIENCE 277,277-80 (1979). For an example of judicial refusal to evaluate conflict-
ing technical data, see Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,507 n.20 (8th Cir. 1975). 
In addition, the problem of certification of class in large plaintiff actions has also deterred 
pollution victims from bringing so-called environmental class actions. In the private Love 
Canal litigation, in which residents and former residents of the area together with 
"transients" who visited the area, attempted to file notices of claim against the City of 
Niagara Falls, Niagara County, and the Board of Education of the City of Niagara Falls, the 
court chose to limit the membership of the class according to a nexus of time and injury. The 
N.Y. Supreme Court sitting in Niagara County held that the issue of notice of claim must be 
dealt with on a case-by-case basis. According to the court, the injuries to the various plaintiffs 
did not occur at the same time, so there was no single date from which to measure the accrual 
of the various causes of action for statute of limitation purposes. Mervak v. City of Niagara 
Falls, 101 Misc.2d 68, at 75, 420 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697 (Sup. Ct., Niagara County 1979). Thus, it is 
quite possible that the highly individualized issue of causation will not lend itself to class action 
suits which requires that "questions of ... fact common to the members of the class 
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in those cases where there is favorable evidence1ll to indicate that 
claimants have suffered harm or are in danger of incurring future in-
jury from chemical pollutants released from a hazardous waste site, 
the standard of legal causation is so extreme in the context of 
hazardous waste injury as to defeat most actions.112 
Concomitant with the burden of proving causation is the deter-
rence effect associated with the enormous costs of developing a 
hazardous waste private damages case. These costs include the 
money necessary to retain an attorney, finance extensive discovery, 
and epidemiological and toxicological studies, and costs to obtain the 
testimony of expert witnesses. The complex technological issues of 
hazardous waste litigation necessitate the extensive use of so-called 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members .... " FED. R. Crv. P. 
23(b)(3). Certainly, it would be difficult to resolve the cause-in-fact issue on a large class-wide 
basis. 
111. Under current tort law, "favorable evidence" would demonstrate the substantiality of 
injury and the hazardous nature of the pollution. Plaintiff would provide evidence of the 
"substantial" or "significant" nature of the injury and contamination by measuring the degree 
of harm and extent of pollution against the total level for the surrounding community. If the 
pollution was substantially exceeding the levels elsewhere, and the increased incidence of in-
jury was significant - greater than the community level for ill health - then plaintiff would 
have provided sufficient evidence to start building the prima facie case. 
The scientific mechanism for translating data into legally sufficient harm would require 
plaintiff to plug the incidence of disease into the numerator of the quotient; the denominator 
being the total base level of ill health in that particular community. B. BROWN, SUprll note 3, at 
58-60. 
112. Two writers in the field of compensation of environmental injury have concluded that, 
"[p ]roducing the evidentiary showing required to sustain the substantive proof of legal causa-
tion is an undertaking of no small magnitude," Soble, supra note 63, at 738; and that "the level 
of certainty required by the legal system may be impossible to attain." Ginsberg & Weiss, 
supra note 65, at 922. 
Even in laboratory experiments, where animals are subjected to comparatively low chronic 
exposures to chemical toxins and carcinogens - as chronic low-level exposures to humans is 
the norm - the conclusions gleaned are not sufficient to translate into legal proof of causation. 
In fact, the levels of exposure the test animals undergo must be extraordinarily high in order 
to obtain a statistically significant result which can meet legal standards of causation. TOXIC 
WASTE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 62 (address by Ira Monson, Chief Medical Officer, CAL-OSHA). 
However, in view of the rarity of forms of cancer associated with exposure to asbestos, 
courts have found adequate legal proof of causation in asbestosis and mesothelioma cases. In 
fact, in asbestos litigation it remains undisputed that exposure to asbestos is the cause of 
asbestosis and mesothelioma. See Dombroff v. Armstrong Cork Co., 79-14048 (Cir. Ct. 11th 
Jud. Cir., August 1981); C.A. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., M-79-145-CA (D.C.E.D. 
Tex. March 13, 1981); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975); 
Borel v. FIbreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 
869 (1974). Here, unlike hazardous waste disease, the process of asbestos-related disease is 
understood, as scientific studies have established a clear link between the inhalation of 
asbestos dust and respiratory disease and cancer. No such "dose-relationship," or threshold 
level of exposure has been established by epidemiological studies on the health effects of com-
monly discharged chemical toxins and carcinogens. See 493 F.2d 1076, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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"exposure," "descriptive," and "causal" expert witnesses at trial. 113 
Even if the potential plaintiff has managed to finance the cost of 
proving causation-or an association-and has ultimately amassed 
legally sufficient proof to identify the hazardous waste as the source 
of the injury, the potential defendant may still be unidentifiable, 
financially insolvent, outside the forum court's jurisdictional reach, 
or may have ceased operations altogether. 
In summary, there are several characteristics of hazardous waste 
injuries which make it difficult to meet the test of legal causation. 
The phenomena of long-latency periods, multiple causal agents and 
effects, and attenuated pollution paths all contribute to the 
epidemiological uncertainty of hazardous waste injury. In contrast 
with medical reality, tort law presumes an understanding of these 
complexities and does not allow for causal uncertainty. 
This gap between the medical acceptance of some uncertainty in 
causation and legally certain causation is itself a major obstacle to 
recovery in a hazardous waste injury suit. In instances of en-
vironmentally-caused disease and cancer, scientists have been will-
ing to infer causation from epidemiological studies evidencing a 
statistically significant association between exposure and injury. 
This scientific finding of an exposure-disease association represents 
a currently valid medical finding of causation. Nonetheless, proof of 
a scientifically valid association does not necessarily meet the stand-
ard of legal causation. 
Ultimately, it is the interrelation of science and law that obstructs 
plaintiffs in establishing causation.114 Scientific conclusions of a 
causal association are conditioned upon experimentation, and 
therefore subject to the conflicting testimony of expert witnesses 
and the incongruities between competing health surveys. Finally, 
even if valid scientific data supporting an association between ex-
posure and injury is obtained, tort law may ignore scientific proof if 
the standards of legal causation are not satisfied. 
IV. OBSTACLES TO COMPENSATION 
A. Legally Cognizable Injury 
Under the common law, proof of injury is a prerequisite to a 
private right of action for personal damages. Some courts have been 
113. S. EpSTEIN, 8'Upra note 7, at 472. 
114. See Large & Michie, 8'Upra note 71, at 581-607. 
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reluctant to find legally cognizable injury based on transitory or 
legally insufficient medical conditions.u6 Courts insist that the right 
to maintain a cause of action does not "accrue" until the claimant 
can show a legally provable injury, i.e., when the injury manifests 
itself with sufficient certainty to be subject to proof in court.U6 Thus, 
a mere "potentiality or threat" of harm is not sufficient to sustain a 
cause of action for personal injury.u7 Instead, the plaintiff must 
allege and prove a present injury based on medically detectable 
symptoms. Reasoned the Fourth Circuit in Sides v. Richard Machine 
Works, Inc.: U8 "If harm had not ensued, there would have been no 
tort and nothing to sue on."U9 
The effect of this approach to legal injury is to preclude "at-risk" 
injury claims.120 Such claims, which rest entirely on alleged harmful 
exposure with no manifestation of effect, and a prediction of future 
harm, would be unsuccessful under tort law since the plaintiff has 
suffered no present injury sufficient to maintain a cause of action. As 
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals explained in Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Co. v. Saltzer,121 "[t]he reason and justice of this 
is perfectly apparent, for a plaintiff who merely feared ultimate 
damages ... under such circumstances would invite defeat if he only 
relied upon his fears and was unable to prove any actual injury."122 
To the potential hazardous waste plaintiff who has been exposed to 
known chemical toxins or carcinogens without incurring immediate 
injury, the common law principle that legal injury does not result un-
til harm actually manifests itself is a nearly insurmountable obstacle 
to recovery. In reality, according to scientists, in incidents of hazard-
ous waste-related disease and cancer, "injury" does not occur upon 
exposure. Rather, such injuries result after a period of chronic ex-
115. See Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Sterling Drug, Inc. 
v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1966); Young v. Clinchfield R.R. Co., 288 F.2d 499 (4th Cir. 
1961). 
116. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Saltzer, 151 Va. 165, 144 S.E. 456, 457-58 (1928). 
117. W. PROSSER, supra note 45, S 30, at 146-47. 
118. 406 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969). 
119. [d. at 446. 
120. This reluctance to award compensatory damages for "at-risk" injuries is particularly 
evident in negligence cases, as "[n]ominal damages, to vindicate a technical right, cannot be 
recovered in a negligence action, where no actual loss has occurred. The threat of future harm, 
not yet realized, is not enough." Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978, 982 (4th Cir. 1977) 
(quoting W. PROSSER, supra note 45, S 30, at 146-47). 
121. 151 Va. 165, 144 S.E. 456 (1928). 
122. 151 Va. at 167, 144 S.E. at 457-58. 
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posure, and typically have extended latency periods before symp-
toms of harm become apparent. 
B. Statutes of Limitations 
The running of the' statute of limitations in certain jurisdictions 
can leave the victim of hazardous waste pollution without legal 
remedy by preventing the filing of suit at the outset. To those per-
sons exposed to chemical waste with resultant injuries unknown or 
inherently unknowable at the time of exposure, a restrictive statute 
of limitations can bar a claim for damages well before the injury 
becomes apparent to the victim. 
The traditional purpose of a statute of limitations is to protect 
defendants from having to defend stale, frivolous suits.l2S A statute 
of limitations runs at the time of the first legal injury, or at the point 
a cause of action accrues, even if the full extent of damages may not 
be known. l24 Ideally, the starting point for the limitation period 
should not be clearly arbitrary or unreasonable in precluding 
claimants from litigating an accrued cause of action. l2S Some courts 
recognize that the power to extend statutes of limitations is vested 
exclusively with each state legislature. l26 Many other state courts, 
however, have been willing to determine when suits accrue for 
statute of limitations' purposes.l27 At trial, the defendant bears the 
burden of proving the defense of the statute of limitationsl28 by 
showing the extent of plaintiff's overall injury that is barred by the 
relevant statute. 
123. R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 43 (1944). See Street v. Con-
sumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1946); Belton v. Traynor, 381 F.2d 82, 87 
(4th Cir. 1967). 
124. See Claudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969); Garrett v. 
Raytheon Co., Inc., 368 So.2d 516, 519 (1979). 
125. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1901); Annotation, Limitation of Actions, 51 AM. 
JUR.2d SS 31-36 (1970). 
126. Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457 (1831). See Thornton v. Roosevelt 
Hospital, 47 N.Y.2d 780, 781-82, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003,417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Sellers v. 
Edwards, 289 Ala. 2, ~65 So.2d 438 (1972). 
127. Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 790171 (Cir. Ct. City of Richmond, March 6, 1981). 
Free v. Ass'd Indem. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 839, 52 S.E.2d 325 (1945); Ross v. Beach Aircraft 
Corp., 214 Kan. 888, 522 P.2d 369 (1977); Frisby v. International Paper. 76 So.2d 621 (La. 
App. 1954); Tillotson v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 47 Mich. App. 427, 209 N.W.2d 427 (1973); 
Struther-Wells Gulfport Inc. v. Bradford, 304 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1981); Borowski v. Armco 
Steel, 188 Neb. 654, 198 N.W.2d 460 (1972); Duncan v. Carpenter, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 
410 (1951); Sierzega v. U.S. Steel Corp., 204 Pa. Super. 531, 205 A.2d 696 (1965); Drake v. 
Raybestos Mfgrs., 241 S.C. 116, 127 S.E.2d 188 (1962); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Price, 224 
Tenn. 188, 452 S.E.2d 349 (1970). 
128. In Massachusetts, for example, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense 
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The long latency periods of many hazardous waste injuries present 
critical statute of limitations difficulties in many state courts where 
the limitation period runs from the date of exposure to the hazard, 
rather than from the time the injury is discovered or the cause ascer-
tained. In these jurisdictions, a personal injury claim is deemed to ac-
crue at the time of the plaintiff's initial contact with the causative 
agent.129 Thus, the statute of limitations runs immediately upon the 
plaintiff's exposure to the potentially harmful materials. Under this 
date-of-exposure limitation period, ignorance of injury or of the ex-
istence of a cause of action will not toll the running of the statute.130 
The underlying problem with this approach is that it presumes that 
"injury" cannot occur without "symptoms." 131 This assumption con-
flicts with the current scientific understanding of the delayed 
biological effects of hazardous waste disease and the cumulative 
nature of exposure to chemical pollutants. 
In the situation where exposure to hazardous waste and injury are 
not simultaneous, any cause of action emanating from the incident 
would be dismissed under the exposure standard. As the United 
States Supreme Court stated in Urie v. Thompson,132 a plaintiff's 
"failure to diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a 
disease whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his consciousness 
would constitute waiver of his right to compensation at the ultimate 
day of discovery and disability."133 Thus, in jurisdictions employing 
the exposure rule, a plaintiff's claim would be barred even though he 
has no way of determining that he has been damaged by a harmful 
chemical substance, as the symptoms may not be evident until the 
statute of limitations has already run. 
which must be pleaded by the defendant if it is to be effective. MASS. R. CIV. P. 8(c). For tort ac-
tions (actions for negligence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability) a complaint must be fIled 
by the plaintiff within three years from the date the claim arises. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
260, S 2A (West 1981). 
129. See Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 
47 N.Y.2d 780, 781-82, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). See also Hutton, 
Statute of Limitations and Radiation Injury, 23 TENN. L. REV. 278 (1954). 
130. Kelley v. Shropshire, 199 Ala. 602, 75 So. 291 (1917); Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 
194 So. 147 (1940). 
131. In Strickland v. Johns-Manville Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. Tex. 1978) the court at-
tempted to draw the distinction between ignorance of a legally-cognizable injury and the 
absence of a legal injury as follows: "It would be unreasonable to dismiss the plaintiff's suit 
because there was no injury and then not allow him to bring the suit years later when 
asbestosis developed on the ground that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." 461 
F. Supp. at 217 (S.D. Tex. 1978). 
132. 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949). 
133. 337 U.S. at 169, 69 S.Ct. at 1024, 93 L.Ed. at 1287. 
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A second starting point for the limitation period, known as the 
"discovery rule," triggers the running of the statute when the injury 
is discovered or should have been discovered by the plaintiff in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence.1s4 There is considerable dispute 
among the courts as to when "discovery" occurs. Under a restrictive 
interpretation, the limitation period runs from the time the plaintiff 
discovers the fact of injury.1S6 As the court in Karjala v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp.,lS6 explained, 
"[t]he plaintiff's claim arises when the harm to his person 
becomes evident. . . . The statute doesn't commence to run 
against [the plaintiff] until he has contracted the disease ... and 
the process of contracting the disease does not cease until 
physical impairment manifests itself."137 
Some state courts have extended the discovery rule to the period 
when the plaintiff discovers the facts giving rise to the cause of ac-
tion, not just the fact of injury.1ss The plaintiff need not know the 
legal cause of the injury or even that he has a cause of action.1S9 
Rather, the facts giving rise to a cause of action need be only those 
sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice that someone is responsible 
for the injury .140 
The third basis for a statute of limitations is the "ascertainment of 
injury causality" rule. While not widely adopted, it is the most ad-
134. Virginia Military Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 760, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977). 
135. See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1102 (1973), em. 
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) ("the cause of action does not accrue until the effects of such ex-
posure manifest themselves"); Assoc. Indemnity Corp. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 124 Cal. 
App. 378, 381, 12 P.2d 1075, 1076 (1932) (the party "can be held to be [legally] injured only 
when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substances manifest themselves"); Roman v. 
A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying Texas law) (discovery occurred when 
plaintiff learned of illness due to drug); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th 
Cir. 1970) (applying Arkansas law) (discovery occurred when disease fully manifested, not at 
discovery of earliest symptom). In Florida, the discovery rule allowed a plaintiff to recover for 
injuries resulting from exposure to X-rays five years prior to the suit. Miami v. Brooks, 70 
So.2d 306 (Fla. 1954). Most recently, the Court of Appeals in Maryland applied the discovery 
rule to an action for cancer allegedly resulting from exposure to harmful asbestos over a 
period of fifteen years ending in 1955. Harig v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., Misc. No.1 
(Ct. App. Md., Nov. 21, 1978). 
136. 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975). 
137. Id. at 159 n.7. 
138. Cadieux v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 593 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1979); Frank Cooke, Inc. v. 
Hurwitz, 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1197,406 N.E.2d 678 (1980); Hendrickson v. Sears, 
365 Mass. 83, 88-91, 310 N.E.2d 131 (1974); Friedman v. Jablonski, 371 Mass. 482, 484-87, 358 
N.E.2d 994 (1976); Nantucket v. Beincke, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2623, 2627-28, 398 N.E.2d 458, 
462-63 (1979). 
139. See supra note 138 (cases cited). 
140. Cadieux v. Inti. Tel. & Tel. Corp., 593 F.2d 142,144 (1st Cir. 1979). See also supra note 
138 (cases cited). 
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vantageous starting point for hazardous waste plaintiffs. Under this 
standard, the statute of limitations does not run until the injured par-
ty is able or should reasonably be able to ascertain a causal connec-
tion between the injury and exposure to the environmental 
hazard.tn Thus, the running of the statute of limitations is tolled un-
til the causal connection for the injury can be recognized. 
Modern case law reflects a pattern of gradual judicial movement 
away from the more rigorous exposure rule to increasing acceptance 
of the liberal standards of discovery, and, to a lesser extent, the 
causality rule. Nonetheless, in the typical case where the symptoms 
of hazardous waste injury are not easily recognized and where causa-
tion is difficult to prove scientifically, even the discovery and causali-
ty rules may be of little avail to the plaintiff. 
The judicial approach to the problem of statutes of limitations most 
receptive to the person exposed to hazardous waste is that which 
tolls the statutory period until the discovery of actual physical or 
mental harm to the plaintiff. In short, the running of the statute 
would not be keyed to the date of exposure, but tied to the plaintiffs 
knowledge of the existence of a potentially legally compensable in-
jury. This approach would ens~e that the recognizable symptoms of 
the disease are evident to the potential claimant prior to triggering 
the running of the statute. Knowledge of injury may thereby compel 
a resident living in proximity to a known hazardous waste site to in-
quire whether the injury is related to a pollution occurrence, and to 
determine whether a causal association with the nearby waste site 
can be drawn. 
Hazardous waste industry critics may argue that the proposed 
standard acts to preserve the open-ended liability of potential 
defendants. Such a fear may prove misplaced, however, since the 
discovery rule would ensure that industry only defend against 
legitimate suits. A premature or speculative claim made by the plain-
tiff based on the unsubstantiated fear of future disability would not 
meet the threshold standard of the discovery approach-there would 
be no recognized injury in such cases. Under the discovery rule, the 
defendant would be free of frivolous suits, while a valid cause of ac-
tion of an aggrieved party would not be precluded by the expiration 
of the limitations period. Further, once an injury is discovered, the 
plaintiff is encouraged to determine the cause of the injury as soon as 
141. See Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying Michigan law) 
(discovery occurred when cause of convulsions learned); Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S.W.2d 211 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1974) (discovery occurred when causal connection learned). 
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possible. Thus, the discovery rule ultimately is capable of protecting 
defendants from stale or frivolous claims while protecting the cause 
of action which, because of its peculiar time-delayed aspects, would 
otherwise be time-barred. 
C. Judicial Assessment of Probability of Causation 
A showing of a probability that a statistically significant correla-
tion exists between exposure to a hazard and injury ordinarily will 
not support a cause of action for compensatory damages under the 
standard of legal causation.142 In response to this, as an alternative 
to traditional legal causation; some courts have adopted probability 
theory to establish causation.143 This judicial probability of causation 
theory requires a high degree of certainty and is applied by the trier 
of fact to determine the likelihood of a causal connection between 
defendant's conduct and a present injury .144 In theory, the probabili-
ty approach to causation differs significantly from the usual stand-
ard of legal causation. In effect, however, the two theories are in-
distinguishable. Most hazardous waste plaintiffs seeking compen-
satory damages will continue to suffer directed verdicts for failure to 
establish causation under the current judicial approach to probability 
theory. 
To prove causation under probability theory, the plaintiff must 
establish that an injury was "more probably than not" caused by a 
particular act or material.145 In contrast, conventional causation 
theory only accepts a definitive showing of cause and effect. Com-
monly known as the "reasonably probable" test (some courts apply 
the term "reasonably certain") this approach measures whether 
statistical evidence of a possibility of medical causation is adequate 
to support a reasonable probability of legal causation.146 The test ex-
amines whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant's 
conduct was a substantial factor in producing the injury .14 7 As the 
142. Soble, supra note 63, at 740-41. 
143. For a discussion of the mathematical probabilities of legal proof, see Tribe, Trial By 
Mathematics, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). See also Large & Michie, supra note 71, at 569-80. 
144. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury 
Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 274-75 (1960). 
145. Id. at 274; W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 241. 
146. Estep, supra note 144, at 274; W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 241. 
147. Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of Liability and 
Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769, 778-80 (1977). 
This is a different test from "but for" causation. See Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-
Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1958). 
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court in Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company 
ofWisconsin148 said: "a possible cause only becomes 'probable' when 
in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations it becomes 
more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action. This is 
the outer limit of inference upon which an issue can be submitted to 
the jury."149 
Rigid application of a "more likely than not" rule would require 
plaintiff to show a greater than 50 percent chance that defendant's 
conduct-ownership, control, transport, disposal, or release of the 
contaminants-was a substantial factor in causing the injury.15o 
Under this standard, it is not enough to show that the probabilities of 
causation were evenly divided.161 Instead, the evidence must balance 
in plaintiff's favor. 162 Accordingly, the more-probable-than-not test 
requires that the trier of fact be at least slightly greater than 50 per-
cent certain that the defendant's acts or omissions caused the plain-
tiff's injury. In those cases where the injury is apparent to both the 
plaintiff and the trier of fact at trial, and where the only proof of a 
causal connection is a statistically significant correlation or associa-
tion drawn between exposure and injury, the chances that all other 
causes together could have caused the injury cannot exceed 49 per-
cent in order for the plaintiff to establish legal causation. 
Evidence of the reasonable probability of causation can be adduced 
by expert testimony.15s Medical opinion suggesting a "possibility" of 
causation, however, will be insufficient under the common law stand-
ards.164 Instead, the medical expert must testify with certainty that 
there is a "reasonable medical probability" that the alleged injury 
was caused by the exposure.155 If an expert witness fails to testify to 
a reasonable medical probability of causation, the plaintiff will suffer 
a directed verdict or fail to convince a jury that legal causation ex-
ists. 
Medical science has not reached the level of sophistication de-
manded by the common law standard of more-probably-than-not. 
148. 440 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. 1969). 
149. [d. at 48. 
150. W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 242. 
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 99, at 428; W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 
242. 
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 99, at 428; W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 
242. 
153. Parker v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d at 51 (1969). 
154. 440 S.W.2d at 46; W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 242. 
155. 440 S.W.2d at 47. 
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Scientists are unable to establish a likelihood greater than 50 percent 
that exposure to a given substance causes injury. Rather, medical 
causation is accepted when there is less than a 3 or 5 percent chance 
that the association established could be accidental. Ultimately, of 
course, as a matter of law, any showing of causation that is not sup-
ported by a 50 percent probability rating is insufficient to support a 
cause of action for money damages. 
V. "AT-RISK" INJURY: 
COMPENSATION FOR ENDANGERMENT OF INJURY 
The traditional common law system provides little hope of 
recovery to the plaintiff without ascertainable injury who seeks com-
pensation for exposure to hazardous waste and the attendant risk of 
harm.166 This can be attributed to the high level of certainty, re-
quired by most courts, by which a plaintiff must show the probability 
of future harm in order to sustain a cause of action for at-risk 
injury.167 To recover damages for exposure to an acknowledged 
harmful substance where there is no proof of actual harm, the plain-
tiff must provide "certain" proof that it is "highly probable" that in-
jury will occur. A showing by the plaintiff of a "possibility" of harm 
is not sufficient to obtain relief.168 Courts have traditionally required 
a showing of a substantial risk that injury will "necessarily result"169 
from exposure and that the future harm will be "substantial."160 
Since the court must determine that the "danger'" of harm-is "real 
and immediate,"161 an at-risk injury claim for hazardous waste ex-
posure, due to the injury's inherent latent and uncertain nature, 
would be too remote to form the basis for relief. 
In recognition of the unfairness inherent in this approach, some 
courts have not strictly adhered to the "highly probable" test of 
determining the substantiality of at-risk injury claims. In Union Car-
bide Corp. v. Industrial Commission,162 the Supreme Court of Col-
orado displayed a willingness to award compensatory damages for 
156. Estep, supra note 144, at 275. 
157. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill.2d 1, 26-27, 426 N.E.2d 824,836-37 
(1981). 
158. 86 Ill.2d at 25-26,426 N.E.2d 824,836 (1981); W. PROSSER, supra note 45, S 90, at 603. 
159. Fink v. Bd. of Trustees, 71 Ill. App.2d 276,281-82,218 N.E.2d 240, 245 (1966); Difanis 
v. Futia, 56 Ill. App.3d 920, 926, 373 N.E.2d 530, 535 (1978). 
160. Springer v. Walters, 139 Ill. 419, 422, 28 N.E. 761, 762 (1891). See also Union 
Drainage Dist. No.6 v. Manteno Limestone Co., 341 Ill. App. 353, 93 N.E.2d 500 (1950). 
161. Fink v. Bd. of Trustees, 71 Ill. App.2d 276, 218 N.E.2d 240 (1966). 
162. 196 Colo. 56, 581 P.2d 734 (1978). 
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"injurious exposure" to "a concentration of toxic material which 
would be sufficient to cause ... disease in the event of prolonged ex-
posure to such concentration."163 In a footnote, the court explained 
the "sufficient to cause" wording of the injurious exposure test in 
light of the tension between the medical and legal definitions of 
causation. 
The problem is that the legal definition is at variance with the 
medical definition. The medical experts do not speak of concen-
trations which are 'sufficient to cause' occupational diseases, but 
rather refer to concentrations which 'increase the risk' of con-
tracting a disease. Insignificant concentrations of radiation do 
not 'increase the risk'; in this case, the epidemiologist testified 
that, in his opinion, . only concentrations in excess of 4 WLMs 
were sufficient to increase the risk of contracting lung cancer. 
We do not find these differences in wording to be meaningful in 
this area of the law. We perceive no reason to get involved in 
'futile searches for unattainable factual certainties.'164 
In Union Carbide Corp., the court reviewed the "last injurious ex-
posure" claim of an employee of Union Carbide who had undergone 
an eight-day exposure to radioactive materials at the company mine. 
Previously, the employee had worked as a uranium miner over a 
sixteen-year period for various employers. He later died of lung 
cancer resulting from exposure to radioactive materials.166 The 
court construed the Colorado Occupational Disease Disability Act166 
to authorize the employer in whose employment the employee was 
"last injuriously exposed"-Union Carbide-to pay the occupational 
disease benefits.167 It rejected the Colorado Court of Appeals' opin-
ion which held that proof of a concentration of toxic material suffi-
cient to "increase the probability" of lung cancer was necessary to 
establish the liability of the employer. 168 Instead, the Colorado 
Supreme Court found injurious exposure from evidence that the 
employee's exposure to concentrations of radiation simply increased 
the risk of contracting lung cancer.169 
In a private suit for compensation of the future risk of a child 
developing epilepsy as a result of an accident, a Virginia federal 
163. 196 Colo. at 58, 581 P.2d at 736. 
164. 196 Colo. at 59, 581 P.2d at 737 n.4 (quoting Mathis v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 10 Or. 
App. 139, 499 P.2d 1331 (1972)). 
165. 196 Colo. at 57, 58, 581 P.2d at 735, 736. 
166. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-112(1) (1976 & Supp. 1980). 
167. Union Carbide Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 196 Colo. at 58, 581 P.2d at 736. 
168. 196 at Colo. at 58 n.4, 581 P.2d at 736 n.4. 
169. 196 Colo. at 60, 581 P.2d at 738. 
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district court, in MeHall v. United States, 170 acknowledged the 
"many intangibles" and "uncertain future developments" which 
make it "more than usually difficult" to conduct a "probability 
estimate" of future disease.171 Several doctors who testified at the 
trial rated the chances that the plaintiff would later develop epilepsy 
as a result of the accident from a low of 3 percent to a high of 25 per-
cent. Despite the uncertain nature of the at-risk injury, the court 
found the "possibility" of "future difficulties" to be sufficient to 
award damages to the plaintiff.172 
In Gomes v. Taylor,173 a state prison inmate was permitted to 
recover for the increased likelihood of contracting cancer due to 
blood tests performed by law authorities in the course of an in-
vestigation. Similarly, in Payton v. Abbott Laboratories,174 a DES 
(diethylstilbestrol) case, conditional certification of an "at-risk" class 
was permitted by the court, absent a determination that there was 
no cause of action on behalf of the questioned class under controlling 
law. There has been no such determination in the case. In Payton, 
the class of plaintiffs was composed of women in Massachusetts ex-
posed to DES in utero, who had not developed uterine or vaginal 
cancer. The plaintiff class was conditionally certified to enable the 
court to determine, among other issues, whether a cause of action 
for the increased risk of developing cancer due to exposure to DES 
is, under Massachusetts law, a compensable claim.176 
The most significant move toward judicial recognition of the legal 
sufficiency of at-risk injury claims has been displayed by a minority 
of courts in prospective public nuisance litigation.176 Although these 
cases largely involve judicial review of agency decisions, they are 
still pertinent to the common law treatment of the private cause of 
action for exposure to hazardous waste. Despite the acknowledged 
scientific uncertainty surrounding risk assessment, these courts 
have recognized the validity of at-risk injury claims. In employing 
170. 206 F. Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962). 
171. [d. at 426. 
172. [d. 
173. No. 77·0228 (D.R.I. March 21, 1979). 
174. 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979), later proceedings, Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 
1031 (D. Mass. 1981). 
175. 83 F.R.D. at 386. 
176. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Reserve 
Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974); Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 
1073 (8th Cir. 1974); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill.2d I, 426 N.E.2d 824 
(1981); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, 77 Ill. App.3d 618, 396 N.E.2d 552 (1979). 
836 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:797 
risk assessment, the courts adopted the rationale for the so-called 
"threatened tort" enunciated in the Second Restatement of Torts, 
that "[t]he more serious the impending harm, the less justification 
there is for taking the chances that are involved in pronouncing the 
harm too remote."l77 Thus, in situations where a claimant individual-
ly or the environment as a whole has been exposed to an extremely 
hazardous activity with potentially. adverse health consequences, 
some courts have been willing to grant injunctive relief on a showing 
of a possibility of harm substantially less than a "dangerous prob-
ability."178 In such cases the public agency has not been required to 
show actual harm or harm certain to occur; rather, the agency has 
been required only to establish a scientifically supportable potential 
for harm. As Judge J. Skelley Wright in his majority opinion in the 
seminal case Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 179 ex-
plained, health "may properly be found endangered by both a lesser 
risk of a greater harm and by a greater risk of a lesser harm."180 
Although the Ethyl Corp. case dealt with section 211(c)(1)(a) of the 
Clean Air Act,181 which authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to 
regulate gasoline additives, emission products of which "will en-
danger the public health or welfare,"182 its importance to the com-
mon law lies in the demonstration of judicial tolerance of the at-risk 
injury claim. Here, the D.C. Circuit, in the face of a challenge by 
manufacturers and refiners of gasoline to regulations promulgated 
by the EPA in accordance with the Act, which mandated annual 
reductions in the lead content of gasoline in part because of lead's 
possible danger to public health, upheld the regulations based on 
uncertain scientific evidence. The court reasoned that less rigor is re-
quired in the establishment of cause and effect where evidence of 
causation is difficult to obtain or involves conflicting expert opinions 
because such decisions are often on the "frontiers of scientific 
knowledge. "188 
In rejecting the traditional high probability requirement for 
establishing the likelihood of future injury where there is clear 
evidence of exposure to a health hazard, courts have also recognized 
that the complexities of environmental medicine make certainty in 
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 99, S 933, at 561 comment b (1979). 
178. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,538 (8th Cir. 1975). 
179. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
180.1d. 
181. 42 U.S.C. S 1857f-6c(c)(1)(A) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
182. 1d. 
183. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d at 28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
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predicting injury for each incident of hazardous waste exposure 
"achievable only after the fact."184 Thus, in a case where certain 
proof of harm was impossible, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, in Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,185 concluded that as-
sessments of danger are dependent upon the relationship between 
the risk and harm presented by each case, and therefore cannot 
legitimately be pegged to "probable harm" without regard to the 
degree of potential harm. 
In Reserve Mining, the EPA, along with the states of Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota, and several environmental groups, 
sought an injunction ordering the Reserve Mining Company to cease 
discharging iron ore refuse into the waters of Lake Superior and into 
the ambient air of Silver Bay, Minnesota. The plaintiffs had argued 
that the discharges into the air and water contained asbestos fibers 
which had been associated by scientists with an increased incidence 
of cancer in humans. The district court granted injunctive relief,186 
ordering an immediate end to the discharges, thereby closing the 
plant. 
On appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, 
holding that the evidence to establish a legally cognizable health risk 
to the public was sufficient only to justify a less stringent form of in-
junction which would not result in closing the plant. The Eighth Cir-
cuit found that the company had been releasing a substance con-
sidered carcinogenic by medical scientists, and ruled that a proper 
assessment of a public health hazard would depend upon an analysis 
of the probability of harm posed by the chemical releases. First, the 
court held that the probability of harm linked to the discharges into 
the water was too low to be legally cognizable, because there was no 
actual proof of past health injury in the area attributable to ingestion 
of the waters of Lake Superior containing the asbestos fibers from 
the plant's discharges. The court found that the only existing proof 
was the medical conclusion that ingestion of asbestos fibers was 
generally a causative factor in increasing the cancer rate among 
asbestos workers. The court ruled, however, that this risk of harm 
associated with the ingestion of asbestos fibers released into the am-
bient air of Silver Bay was supported by the more substantial proof 
of a correlation between the inhalation of asbestos dust and subse-
quent illness in the area. Thus, although the health hazard could only 
184. 641 F.2d at 26. 
186. 614 F.2d 492,620 (8th Cir. 1976). 
186. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974). 
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be measured in terms of a concern for the public health based on a 
reasonable medical probability rather than based on certain proof of 
actual harm, the court found the degree of risk sufficient to justify an 
injunction to abate the health hazard "as a precautionary and 
preventive measure to protect the public health."187 
As these cases illustrate, some courts have adopted a "probability 
of risk-consequences of harm" risk assessment analysis188 to pro-
vide relief for an unreasonable risk of environmental injury. Such a 
balancing analysis is essentially a substitute for the traditional equity 
weighing of the social utility of the prospective tortious conduct of 
the defendant against the potential damage that can result from that 
conduct. Under this innovative approach to determining whether a 
potential threat to health is of sufficient gravity to be legally 
compensable, the greater the gravity of the potential harm the less 
potential risk the plaintiff need show to obtain relief. Thus, the D.C. 
Circuit concluded in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA that the "magnitude of the 
risk sufficient" to justify relief is "inversely proportional to the harm 
to be avoided."189 
This judicial approach to the analysis of a legally cognizable at-risk 
injury can be appropriately applied to the area of hazardous waste in-
juries. Specifically, to the extent that there is proof that potentially 
187. Reserve Mining v. EPA, 514 F.2d at 520. 
In both Ethyl Corp. and Reserve Mining, no claim of ascertainable injury was made by the 
public agency. Instead, the federal appeals court in each case inferred an endangerment to 
public health from evidence suggesting an association between ill health and exposure to 
hazardous waste. In Ethyl Corp., the EPA introduced medical studies evidencing associations 
between increased lead levels in the "blood of persons exposed to lead and a variety of diseases. 
541 F.2d at 39 n.85. Supported by this statistical evidence, the EPA constructed a causal 
model demonstrating the link between leaded gasoline automotive emissions and morbidity. 
See LARGE & MICHIE, supra note 71, at 604. The EPA concluded, fIrst, that elevated blood lead 
levels exist to a small but signifIcant extent in the general adult population, and to a greater 
extent among children; second, that airborne lead absorbed directly into the body through 
respiration constitutes a signifIcant risk to the public; and third, that airborne lead falls to the 
ground where it mixes with dust and poses a signifIcant threat to the health of urban children. 
[d. The appeals court supported the EPA contention that airborne lead, which accumulates on 
the surface, is an endangerment to children, by employing inferences similar to the causal 
paradigm used in Reserve Mining: First, high concentrations of lead in dust and dirt are found 
in urban areas; second, lead from exhaust is the primary source of lead in urban dust and dirt; 
third, children prone to pica, about fIfty percent of those between one year and three years, eat 
nonfood items including dust and dirt; therefore, children in urban areas can be expected to ab-
sorb lead in this fashion. [d. at 605. 
188. See, e.g., Carolina Envt'l Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
189. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
Wrote Judge J. Skelley Wright in his dissent in the D.C. Circuit's initial consideration of 
Ethyl Corp.: "The signifIcance of the risk . . . can only be ascertained through knowledge of 
the threatened harm, and it is the total risk of harm that must be sufficient to endanger the 
1982-83] HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION 839 
severe consequences do result from chemical emissions from a 
hazardous waste site, rather than prove the common law standard 
that the probability of harm occurring must be "more likely than 
not" (greater than 50 percent), the plaintiff need only prove a 
"potential" of harm190 (greater than a remote probability) or provide 
evidence of a "reasonable medical concern" that injury will occur.191 
Indeed, as Justice Ryan of the Illinois Supreme Court wrote in his 
concurring opinion in Village of Wilsonville v. SeA Services, Inc., 192 
the reason a relatively slight showing of probability of risk of future 
harm is justified is that the consequences of the probable harm from 
hazardous waste releases are particularly great. 
[T]here are situations where the harm that is potential is so 
devastating that equity should afford relief even though the 
possibility of the harmful result oceurring is uncertain or con-
tingent .... If the harm that may result is severe, a lesser prob-
ability of it occurring should be required .... Conversely, if the 
potential harm is less severe, a greater probability that it will 
happen should be required.19s 
In Village of Wilsonville, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a 
lower court injunction requiring the closure of a hazardous waste 
disposal site and the removal of its contents, based on prospective 
public nuisance theory. Cognizant of the extremely hazardous nature 
of the chemicals being dumped, including PCB substances, and fear-
ful of the potentially catastrophic results of migration of the 
chemicals into the nearby water supply and ambient air, the court 
balanced the relative hardship to the plaintiffs and benefits to the 
defendant of permitting the site to operate and concluded that the 
site's dangers outweighed its utility.194 Despite a lower court holding 
public health." Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, Civil No. 73-2205 (D.C. Cir. 1975) at 14 n.14 (dissenting 
opinion). 
190. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d at 20. 
191. Id. See also Smith v. Smith, No. 80-2197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2d Dist., Nov. 18, 1981). 
Here, the expert witness testified with reasonable medical certainty that while the plaintiff did 
not at the time of trial have cancer, there was a significant risk that the disease would recur at 
a later date. The court awarded damages. 
192. 86 Ill.2d 1, 37-38, 426 N.E.2d 824, 842 (1981). See also Reserve Mining v. EPA, 514 
F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1975). 
193. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill.2d 1, 37-38, 426 N.E.2d 824, 842 
(1981). Justice Ryan concluded: 
This balancing test allows the court to consider a wider range of factors and avoids 
the anomalous result possible under a more restrictive alternative where a person 
engaged in an ultrahazardous activity with potentially catastrophic results would be 
allowed to continue until he has driven an entire community to the brink of disaster. 
A court of equity need not wait so long to provide relief. 
Id., at 38, 426 N.E.2d 824, 842 (1981). 
194. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill.2dl, 35, 426 N.E.2d 824, 841 (1981). 
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that evidence that the hazardous substances would actually migrate 
out of the landfill and contaminate outside areas was uncertain, 
because contingent upon the existence of conditions in the subsur-
face which were not known,196 the Illinois Supreme Court had "no 
doubt" of the high probability that the chemical disposal site would 
bring about a substantial injury. 
[W]e think it is sufficiently clear that it is highly probable that 
the instant site will constitute a public nuisance if, through 
either an explosive interaction, migration, subsidence, or the 
'bathtub effect,' the highly toxic chemical wastes deposited at 
the site escape and contaminate the air, water, or ground 
around the site .... A court does not have to wait for it to hap-
pen before it can enjoin such a result.196 
In Woburn, it has been predicted that the consequences of 
chemical contamination will be severe.197 Conceivably, by analogy to 
the probability-of-risk-consequences-of-harm analysis, a potential 
Woburn claimant seeking compensatory damages should be required 
only to prove a reasonable likelihood of risk to recover damages for 
at-risk injury. There are, however, problems in applying this balanc-
ing approach to the Woburn incident. Public health officials have 
been unable to establish that the waste discharges into the air, 
water, and soil from the hazardous waste site give rise to a potential 
threat to human health. In fact, medical scientists have yet to 
discover a significant probability that drinking the contaminated 
water or breathing the polluted air will increase the propensity for 
disease among residents. At most, scientists can forecast that the ex-
istence of chemical contamination and environmental exposures to 
the population create a reasonable medical concern of health risk. 
This appraisal may be sufficiently translated into a "reasonable 
likelihood of harm" to enable the trier of fact to award damages for 
at-risk injury. But as has been seen above, only a minority of courts 
have displayed a judicial willingness to accept such argument. 
To obtain at least theoretical judicial support for the at-risk injury 
claim, the hazardous waste plaintiff may turn to the prospective 
public nuisance balancing approach incorporated in Village of 
Wilsonville. The circumstances surrounding Village of Wilsonville, 
however, can be distinguished from the Woburn incident. In Village 
of Wilsonville, plaintiffs seeking the injunction alleged no present 
196. village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 77 m. App.3d 618,634-36,396 N.E.2d 
662, 663 (1979). 
196. Village ofW"llsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 m.2d 1, 27, 426 N.E.2d 824, 837 (1981). 
197. See supra text and notes at notes 10, 13, 16, 18,94,96. 
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harm to any person. In addition, plaintiffs did not cite an example of 
direct human exposure to the chemical waste at the site. The perma-
nent injunction was upheld due to the high probability that a public 
nuisance would result if a release from the waste site occurred. Since 
only an injunction was sought the probability that a disease 
generating pollution incident would indeed occur was not the only 
factor in the risk weighing analysis conducted by the court.198 The 
waste site did not have to cause diseases to be enjoined as a public 
nuisance. In contrast, potential plaintiffs in Woburn must go con-
siderably further to obtain compensatory relief. To start a suit a 
plaintiff must document incidents of exposure to waste materials 
originally buried at the site, establish the migratory pathway from 
the waste site to the person, and at a minimum, demonstrate a causal 
association between the death and disease pattern in the community 
and proximity to the site. A finding by the court that substantial in-
jury would result from a release of pollutants contained at the site 
would not by itself support recovery of compensatory damages by a 
Woburn plaintiff. The enjoining of such a "nuisance" does little to 
compensate the victims. 
VI. INTRODUCTION TO PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
It is accepted that the dumping of hazardous wastes in landfills and 
open pits near residential communities poses a significant en-
vironmental and public health problem. The unique complexities of 
hazardous waste injuries, where causes are varied, effects diverse, 
latency periods long, and exposures difficult to reconstruct, make 
epidemiological diagnosis uncertain. The problem of causal uncer-
tainty is further complicated by the fact that cancer now accounts 
for nearly 20 percent of deaths each year; about 55 million people 
now alive have contracted or will eventually contract cancer.199 
198. See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 m.2d 1, 26-27, 426 N.E.2d 824, 
836-37 (1981). 
199. Experts have agreed that 60 to 90% of cancers are caused by environmental factors 
rather than by genetic factors. Environmental factors include substances in the food one eats, 
cigarettes, or substances in the water and air. TOXIC SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMMITTEE, 
REpORT TO THE PRESIDENT at VII-4 to VII-6 (Aug., 1979) (Draft), summary printed in 44 Fed. 
Reg. 48,134 - 48,140 (1979); COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1976); S. 
EpSTEIN, supra note 7, at 326. See supra note 7. Industry representatives cite estimates that 
only 1 to 6% of cancer cases have been shown to be attributable directly to man-made 
chemicals. See 3 CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) (Curr. Rep.) 1, 109 (1979). Such arguments and 
estimates both ignore the accepted knowledge that cancers are caused by multiple factors in 
the environment. TOXIC SUBSTANCES STRATEGY COMM., supra this note, at V1I-9. 
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Thus, it becomes even more difficult to isolate the causes of a single 
case of cancer in an area near a hazardous waste site, since some 
residents will incur cancer regardless of their exposure to hazardous 
waste pollution. 
In addition, the public regulatory system is inadequate to provide 
relief to the victims of hazardous waste pollution.2oo Federal statutes 
and most state public remedies do not recognize a private cause of 
action for victim compensation. Nor is it likely that the scope of 
public law will be expanded during the tenure of the Reagan Ad-
ministration to include compensation of hazardous waste victims. 
Further, a gap exists. between medical acceptance of causation and 
legal acceptance in case law which makes proof of legal causation 
nearly impossible, through no fault of the injured party. 
Since public law cannot handle the problem of compensating per-
sons injured by exposure to hazardous waste, the common law must 
respond to this conundrum. The gap in federal and state legislation is 
in the domain of the state courts, where persons exposed to hazard-
ous waste can obtain compensation. In light of the evidentiary and 
substantive obstacles to bringing a private damages action in state 
court, the courts must reform relevant case law to ensure greater 
availability of courts to hazardous waste plaintiffs. 
In view of the broad societal and economic weighing of equities im-
plicit in tort law, the Woburn hazardous waste pollution incident 
presents a fundamental question: are the innocent victims of an inac-
tive hazardous waste disposal site to be compensated at the expense 
of industries that produced and/or disposed those wastes or operated 
the site? In Cities Service Co. v. Florida,201 a case involving a mining 
operation which polluted state waterways, the Florida Supreme 
Court concluded that the obligation to pay money damages should be 
imposed on the profit-oriented mining company, despite the com-
munity importance of their mining activities. As the court stated: 
Though there are still many hazardous activities which are 
socially desirable, it now seems reasonable that they pay their 
own way. It is too much to ask an innocent neighbor to bear the 
burden thrust upon him as a consequence of an abnormal use of 
the land next door. 202 
Some state courts and legal theorists203 have balanced the equities 
associated with indispensable, yet hazardous industry activities, by 
200. See supra text and notes at notes 31-36. 
201. 312 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1975). 
202. [d. at 801. 
203. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 
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awarding liability to the party best able to absorb and distribute the 
costs of the injury-producing enterprise. In his concurring opinion in 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling CO.,204 Justice Traynor of the California 
Supreme Court sought to spread the costs of injury-costs that 
might overwhelm an individual-to the manufacturers who can in-
sure against the risk or pass the higher costs on to their customers. 
"[T]he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an over-
whelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for 
the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed 
among the public as a cost of doing business."20s In this manner, the 
generator or waste site operator can either insure against this liabili-
ty, or recover the costs of preventing such injuries by passing those 
costs on to consumers in the form of higher prices for its products, 
either the sources or products of hazardous wastes. Since consumers 
benefit from having chemical products available, it is more equitable, 
the Traynor view would argue, that the consumers in the mar-
ketplace, rather than hazardous waste victims ultimately bear the 
full costs associated with the products-including the costs of dispos-
ing hazardous wastes. 
Justice Traynor's approach can also be supported on purely 
economic grounds consonant with tort law. If the full societal cost of 
manufacture is not incorporated in the price of the waste generating 
products, these products will enjoy an unwarranted financial advan-
tage in the marketplace. Either their cost will exceed safer alter-
native products or, perhaps, prevent the introduction of those prod-
ucts into the marketplace. In effect, the artificially low cost of these 
waste producing products will be unwittingly subsidized by the inno-
cent victims of hazardous waste exposure. 
The court system faces a choice in hazardous waste injury litiga-
tion. First, it can impose risks of injury upon persons residing near 
hazardous waste sites. Under this alternative, hazardous waste in-
jury may be regarded as an unavoidable cost of modern technology, 
and courts will only provide sporadic compensation, if at all, under 
traditional tort law. Second, in order to ensure that serious injuries 
suffered by large numbers of people without a satisfactory source of 
public relief are compensated, the courts can recast traditional tort 
standards of legal proof. 
1060·74 (1972); CaIabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distriirution and the Law afTorts, 70 YALE 
L.J. 499, 517 (1961); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 
1172, 1175-79 (1952). 
204. 24 CaI.2d 453, 150 P .2d 436 (1944). 
205. 24 CaI.2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441. 
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This article proposes a change in the legal standards of proof on 
the threshold issues of legal causation, legal injury, the burden of 
production, and the burden of proof, to facilitate the maintenance of 
a prima facie cause of action for personal damages by persons in-
jured from exposure to hazardous waste. This article also proposes a 
change in which party carries the burden of persuasion-the risk of 
non-persuasion-from plaintiff to defendant. By adjusting the 
balance between plaintiff and defendant in hazardous waste injury 
litigation, aggrieved parties will be able to overcome the chief 
obstacle to recovery: the non-suit, either upon the motion to dismiss 
or at the directed verdict stage of the trial. 
First, the proposed approach modifies the concept of legal causa-
tion to respond to the medical realities of hazardous waste injuries. 
Under this proposal, a valid scientific demonstration of causation can 
be translated into sufficient proof of legal causation to enable the 
plaintiff to survive a directed verdict. Accordingly, the plaintiff need 
only show an association-a statistically significant correlation- be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the alleged injury. Documenta-
tion of a significant correlation which withstands the statistical prob-
ability of error test206 constitutes competent proof of legal cause and 
establishes the prima facie showing of causation. Thus, a plaintiff is 
not required to meet the traditional test of legal causation-that a 
particular exposure directly caused the injury more probably than 
not (greater than 50 percent chance). 
Second, the traditional concept of legal injury will be broadened to 
enable a plaintiff· without ascertainable injury to bring a private 
damages action for at-risk injury due to exposure to hazardous 
wastes. To withstand the defense motion for non-suit or a directed 
verdict, plaintiff must allege and prove that exposure to hazardous 
contaminants has occurred, and that a reasonable likelihood has 
arisen that exposure to the contaminants may potentially lead to 
future injury as established by medical research. 
Third, the conventional tort standard to guide the trier of fact in 
determining the burden of production, the burden of coming forward 
with evidence, will be changed from a preponderance of the evidence 
to a reasonable likelihood. Under the traditional common law 
system, in order to avoid a directed verdict, judges require the plain-
tiff to carry the burden of production sufficiently to convince a jury 
by a preponderance of the evidence that there were legally 
206. For a discussion of the statistical test S66 supra text and notes at notes 89-90. 
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cognizable exposure and injury. 207 In fact, in most hazardous waste 
incidents, aggrieved parties will be unable to meet the burden of 
coming forward with a preponderance of the evidence sufficient to 
establish legal causation and injury, and thereby will suffer directed 
verdicts. 
Fourth, the standard for determining whether a litigant has met 
the ultimate burden of proof by which the jury would be persuaded in 
favor of the party carrying the burden will be changed from a 
preponderance of the evidence to a reasonable likelihood. Under 
traditional tort law, in order to find for the plaintiff, the jury must 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff has 
established the elements of the cause of action.208 Again, in light of 
the uncertainty of hazardous waste injuries, a claimant would likely 
fail to prove to the jury that a preponderance of the evidence sup-
ports the truth of the claim asserted and thus, the claimant would 
suffer a directed verdict. 
Fifth, if the plaintiff satisfies the threshold requirements of the 
proposal, thereby setting forth a prima facie case, the burden of per-
suasion-the risk of nonpersuasion-shifts to the named defendant 
to come forward with sufficient evidence-a preponderance of the 
evidence-to rebut the plaintiff's case. In the absence of any con-
trary showing by the defendant, plaintiff can obtain a directed ver-
dict. If, however, the defendant does offer evidence in rebuttal, yet 
fails to convince the trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence 
as to the truth of his defense in evidence, a verdict may still be 
directed against the defendant. 
This proposal creates a precise analytical framework by which the 
victim of hazardous waste pollution can sustain a cause of action for 
private damages relief. The proposal itself is a hybrid, combining the 
fundamental elements of the 1980 Senate proposal (S. 1480) for a 
private compensatory fund under Superfund,209 the State of Califor-
nia Hazardous Substance Account Act of 1981,210 and the prob-
207. W. PROSSER. supra note 45, S 38, at 208. 
208. Id. 
209. See Environmental Emergency Response Act. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. SS 2-12 
CONGo REC. 14,930, 14,932 (1980). S. 1480 established a $4 billion compensation fund and con-
tained broad liability provisions, calling for strict, joint and several liability among a range of 
potentially responsible parties. In addition, it covered private injuries and included provisions 
for the payment of medical expenses. The measure providing for private recovery of damages 
was dropped from the legislation after a compromise measure was agreed upon with the House 
of Representatives at the end of the lame duck session in early December, 1980. 
210. State of California Hazardous Substance Account Act of 1981, ch. 756, 1981 Cal. 
Legis. Servo 2619 (West) (to be codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE S 25300). 
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ability-of-risk-consequences-of-harm balancing theory adopted by 
some courts in prospective public nuisance cases.211 
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR THE DETERMINATION 
OF LEGAL CAUSATION 
A. Injury-In-Fact212 
If a claimant with ascertainable injury introduces evidence suffi-
cient to enable the trier of fact to find first, that the claimant was or 
is exposed to a hazardous substance or hazardous substances found 
in a discharge, release, or disposal; second, that there exists a 
reasonable likelihood that exposure to such substance or substances 
causes or significantly contributes to injury or disease of the class or 
type which that claimant alleges to have suffered; and third, that the 
exposure was or is of a sufficient amount and duration that there ex-
ists a reasonable likelihood that it caused or contributed to the type 
or class of injury or disease which that claimant alleges to have suf-
fered; then the trier of fact shall determine that the hazardous 
substance caused or significantly contributed to the injuries or 
disease which the claimant alleges to have suffered. Further, if a 
claimant introduces evidence sufficient to enable the trier of fact to 
find that there exists a reasonable likelihood that a party or group of 
parties caused or significantly contributed to the pertinent exposure 
or injury, then it shall be determined that such party caused or 
significantly contributed to the injuries or disease suffered by that 
claimant. 
In considering those circumstances under which the defendant is 
liable to the plaintiff, the trier of fact may examine the following 
catalogue of evidence tending to establish that the hazardous 
substances in question causes or contributes to the injury or disease 
alleged by the claimant: 1) evidence indicating an increase in in-
cidence of the alleged injury or disease in the exposed population 
211. See supra text and notes at notes 176, 188. 
Further, so as not to obscure the pivotal role of the causation determination in the proposed 
compensation framework, the related problem of tort liability will not be discussed. For an 
analysis of the issue of liability as it concerns the generators and disposers of hazardous waste, 
see, e.g., Ewell v. Petro Processors Of Louisiana, 364 So.2d 604 (Ct. of App. La. 1978); Curry 
Coal Co. v. M.C. Arnoni Co., 439 Pa. Commw. Ct. 114, 266 A.2d 678 (1970); Boroughs v. 
Joiner, 337 So.2d 340 (Ala. 1976); W. PROSSER, supra note 45, 5 78, at 509; Note, The Rylands 
v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous, mt:rahazardous, or Absolute 
Nuisance?, ARIz. ST. L. J. 99, 100 (1978). 
212. This section mirrors in pertinent part the presumption of cause element in S. 1480, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 4(c)(3)(A)-4(c)(3)(B)(4), 126 CONGo REC. 14932, 14941 (1980). 
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above the measured level of morbidity and mortality in the otherwise 
unexposed population; 2) results of pertinent epidemiological 
(without regard to the sample) and toxicological studies; 3) results of 
relevant animal studies; 4) results of pertinent tissue culture and 
microorganism culture studies; 5) information on the correlations 
between chemicals and their potential to cause harm; and 6) studies 
of the effects of environmental exposures on chemical materials, the 
potential effects of disease by those materials and the metabolic 
transformation of those materials. 
In addition, the trier of fact, in deciding whether the defendant is 
liable to the plaintiff, should also examine the following threshold 
questions: 1) to what substances was the plaintiff exposed and under 
what conditions; 2) did other people exposed to the same substance 
contract similar diseases or harm; 3) was the plaintiff exposed to 
other substances that are capable of causing this disease which can-
not be traced to the discharge, release, or disposal at issue; 4) what is 
the expected occurrence of the disease-injury-harm for people 
without such exposure; and 5) did plaintiff's own conduct or existing 
environmental conditions increase the risk of contracting the disease 
or injury? 
A showing of legal cause by the plaintiff shifts the burden of pro-
duction and proof to the defendant to persuade the trier of fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there is not a reasonable 
likelihood that exposure to the pertinent hazardous substance caused 
or significantly contributed to the injuries alleged by the claimant. 
Likewise, the identification of a causal relationship shifts the 
burdens of production and proof to the defendant to persuade the 
trier of fact by a preponderance of the evidence that there is not a 
reasonable likelihood that the defendant caused or significantly con-
tributed to the injuries alleged by the claimant. 
To fulfill the burden of persuasion, defendant's arguments of 
rebuttal may take the following form: first, the defendant may allege 
and prove that it did not generate or release the environmental con-
taminants at issue; second, that the hazardous waste materials 
generated by the defendant could not have migrated along an en-
vironmental pathway from the landfill to the injured person; third, 
that the hazardous wastes in defendant's control could not have pro-
duced the etiology attributed to the pollution by plaintiff's showing; 
fourth, that the defendant was not solely responsible for the hazard-
ous waste pollution at issue; and fIfth, due to chemical synergism, 
the hazardous wastes within defendant's control by itself could not 
have comprised the injury or disease causing substance. 
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Under the contribution provision of the California Superfund 
law,213 any defendant to an action for recovery of the cost of 
response to a release or threatened release of hazardous substances 
may make a motion to the court to join any other party who may be 
liable for costs or expenditures under the state act.214 If a party can 
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it is only responsible 
for a portion of the costs of response, the court must duly apportion 
the damages.215 Similarly, Senate Bill 1480 recognized a defendant 
action to limit or apportion liability according to the degree of con-
tribution.216 
B. At-Risk Injury 
If a claimant without ascertainable injury introduces evidence to 
enable the trier of fact to find: first, that the claimant was or is ex-
posed to a hazardous waste substance or substances found in a 
discharge, release, or disposal; second, that there exists a reasonable 
likelihood that the chemical wastes released are dangerous to 
humans due to the amount and the type of hazardous waste sub-
stances involved; and third, that there exists a reasonable likelihood 
that exposure to such waste substances will cause or contribute to a 
potential risk that the claimant will contract disease-injury-harm; ex-
posure to the dangerous waste substances has increased the poten-
tial for injury occurring and should therefore be compensable. Fur-
ther, if a claimant without ascertainable injury introduces'evidence 
sufficient to enable the trier of fact to find that there exists a 
reasonable likelihood that a party or group of parties caused or con-
tributed to the pertinent hazardous exposure, then the trier of fact 
shall determine that such party or parties caused or contributed to 
the potential risk that the claimant will contract disease or injury in 
the future. 
Assessment of the potential risk of harm can be based upon one's 
proximity to the location where the hazardous waste has been 
emitted and upon the duration, intensity, and frequency of exposure. 
The calculation of compensable risk is also based upon the prediction 
213. Cal. Superfund, ch. 756 5 2, 1981 Cal. Legis. Servo at 2618·19 (West) (to be codified at 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 55 25362·25363). 
214. [d. at 52, 1981 Cal. Legis. Serv., at 2618 (to be codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CoDE 5 25362). 
215. [d. at 52,1981 Cal. Legis, Servo at 2618-19 (to be codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CoDE 5 25363). 
216. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 5(c)(3)(B)(f)(2), 126 CONGo REC. 14932, 14941 (1980). 
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of the consequences of human exposure to the substances at issue. 
For a plaintiff to establish that the exposure to the pollutants re-
leased from the hazardous waste site increased the risk of future 
disease-injury-harm, plaintiff should not be required to prove that in-
jury will probably result from exposure. Instead, the claimant need 
only provide expert witnesses testifying to a reasonable medical con-
cern that exposure increased the risk of potential injury. 
Once plaintiff meets this burden, the" burdens of production and 
proof are shifted to the defendant to persuade the trier of fact by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there is not a reasonable 
likelihood that defendant placed the claimant at risk of incurring 
future injury. Such arguments of rebuttal can take the following 
form: first, that the likely effect of exposure to the hazardous waste 
substances within the defendant's control could not cause future in-
jury; second, that the hazardous waste substances were not 
generated or released by defendant at the time the plaintiff claims to 
have been exposed to hazardous waste; and third, that the hazardous 
waste substances within the defendant's control could not have 
migrated into the claimant's environment. 
VIII. DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSAL IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE WOBURN DUMPSITE 
The unique characteristics of hazardous waste injuries, ranging 
from the long latency periods to the cumulative nature of exposure, 
make precise legal proof of causation nearly impossible. Cognizant of 
this scientific reality, this proposal has sought to bring existing legal 
standards of proof into conformity with modern medical reality. 
Such a proposed "leap of faith" from traditional tort doctrine to 
judicial acceptance of the medical approach to causation confronts 
our common law courts with two distinct options. To quote the 
California Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories ,217 "[t]he response 
of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, deny-
ing recovery to those injured by ... products, or to fashion remedies 
to meet ... changing needs."218 
In Woburn, Massachusetts, dangerous chemical carcinogens and 
toxins from a nearby hazardous waste site have been released into 
the air and groundwater of a small residential community, thereby 
threatening its inhabitants with the risk of contracting various 
217. 26 Cal.3d 588,607 P.2d 924 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). 
218. 26 Cal.3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936. 
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diseases and cancers. Already, a microepidemic of childhood 
leukemia and renal cancer has been identified. Independent evidence 
also suggests that disease and mortality rates are unusually high in 
the area. Nonetheless, potential plaintiffs are confounded by the 
nearly insurmountable obstacles posed by the formal requirements 
of legal proof of causation. 
Under this article's proposal, where a casual association can be 
established, a potential Woburn plaintiff exposed to hazardous 
materials may be able to sustain a cause of action for private 
damages. The plaintiff need not isolate the precise exposure nor 
identify the landfill owner's specific waste contaminants which ac-
tually caused the injury; nor must the plaintiff ultimately prove with 
absolute. certainty that the particular exposure directly caused the 
injury. Documentation of a reasonable likelihood of a disease causing 
relationship with the exposure should constitute sufficient proof to 
make the prima facie case of legal causation. 
As an alternative to the public regulatory solution, the private tort 
suit can be seen as the market's answer to the problem of hazardous 
waste pollution injury in much the same way as products liability doc-
trine functions. Due to the potential costs of defendant accountabili-
ty that may be incurred by the generator or disposer of hazardous 
waste, or by the waste site operator, a common law framework for 
compensation may provide financial incentives for regulatory com-
pliance. At the same time, it would spread the tort loss among the 
manufacturers of chemical products and, ultimately, the consumers 
of the end products of hazardous waste. This way the costs of liabili-
ty will move up the industry ladder from the generator to the 
transporter, disposer, and manufacturer. 
If persons exposed to hazardous waste are barred from recovery 
for injury due to the considerable barriers of legal proof, the 
generators of the waste or the operators of the waste sites will have 
profited from their activities without liability for the harm produced. 
Such informal immunity is unlikely to deter the waste producer or 
landfill owner from continuing to contaminate the surrounding en-
vironment. Indeed, any waste generating party which spent funds to 
bring its activities into regulatory compliance would be put at a com-
petitive disadvantage against those parties that save money by ex-
posing the public to dangerous waste materials. That unequal treat-
ment cuts against elemental principles of tort law. 
Under this proposal, however, the common law courts may still be 
an unsatisfactory source of relief when the party responsible for the 
release of the hazardous substances and the resulting damages can-
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not be identified. Moreover, even if a responsible defendant can be 
found, it is still difficult to prove a reasonable likelihood of a disease 
association, especially where an unseen substance unknowingly in-
gested at an indeterminant time is involved. Assuredly, the defend-
ant will provide a series of expert witnesses who will challenge the 
determination of a reasonable likelihood of causation, which may 
result in extensive witness examinations, creating delays and a bat-
tle of experts in the progression of the suit. Further, the expensive 
nature of developing a plaintiff's hazardous waste injury case may 
still deter victims with damages smaller than the potential costs of 
litigation from bringing suit at all. 
Compensating plaintiffs for at-risk injury claims at the time of ex-
posure based on the reasonable chance that they will incur future 
disease is also problematic. Since it is·impossible to distinguish in ad-
vance the exposed persons who will contract disease from those who 
will not, courts may compensate some plaintiffs for the risk of in-
juries that they never will suffer. Further, courts may award money 
damages, upon proof of exposure, which will inadequately compen-
sate those plaintiffs who later suffer extraordinary injuries, includ-
ing death. 
Critics may also justifiably argue that the effect of shifting the 
burden of persuasion from plaintiff to defendant may be to 
guarantee that plaintiffs who establish the prima facie case will 
automatically prevail, as defendants are no more capable of disprov-
ing factual causation than plaintiffs are of proving it.219 The result of 
such an alleged bias in the proposal may be to encourage massive 
personal injury litigation due to hazardous waste exposure, with 
devastating financial consequences for defendant parties. Indeed, 
there may not be enough money to compensate claimants for the 
variety of injuries which may attach from exposure to hazardous 
wastes. Thus, in view of the magnitude of money damages potential-
ly involved in a judgment order for plaintiff, it is possible that the 
culpable defendant may not have the sufficient financial assets or in-
surance coverage to pay the damages awarded by a court. 
The potential enormity of judgment orders may also lead to 
economic dislocation in the hazardous waste industry. Substantial 
adverse judgments may drive defendants out of business who cannot 
afford to pay the costs of litigation or liability, as well as deterring 
others from entering the industry altogether. Indeed, it is con-
219. 26 Cal.3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 947 (1980) (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
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ceivable that those waste site operators, generators, and disposers 
who bring their injury producing activities into regulatory com-
pliance may still be liable under common law tort for personal injury 
damages, due to the lack of a private cause of action for compen-
satory relief in public law. In view of the undeniable need for 
facilities to dispose of industrial hazardous wastes,220 and the 
already considerable financial investment made by existing site 
operators in providing the needed service,221 society may not be able 
to afford the proposed changes in the litigation of hazardous waste 
suits. Indeed, it may be preferable to have hazardous waste sites 
than to have illegal dumping in rivers, streams, and deserted 
areas. 222 
IX. CONCLUSION 
It is precisely in the residential communities that ring hazardous 
waste sites where the public health must be carefully safeguarded. 
There will rarely, if ever, be scientific agreement on "safe" levels of 
exposure in those situations where on the one hand, large industries 
are at stake and on the other, there is substantial evidence of 
material adverse health effects in the exposed population. Predict-
ably, in these situations exposed and possibly injured residents will 
turn to their state and federal government for relief. Yet, the public 
regulatory system cannot provide compensation to persons harmed 
or endangered by hazardous waste releases. 
To the person exposed to hazardous waste seeking compensation 
for injury or the endangerment of health outside public law, state 
courts remain a largely inaccessible forum for relief. The problem of 
multiply-caused, time-delayed injuries is an anomaly to a legal 
system that does not recognize the medical phenomenon of the 
uncertain human health effects of hazardous waste pollution. 
Without flexibility or alterations in the common law, it is likely that 
most victims of hazardous waste pollution will continue to unsuccess-
fully litigate personal injury claims, and, thus, will remain uncom-
pensated. 
220. See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc. 77 m. App.3d 618,636,896 N.E.2d 
562, 564 (1979). 
221. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 m.2d 1, 28-24, 426 N.E.2d 824, 886 
(1981). 
222. It!.. at 80-81, 426 N.E.2d 824, 8S8 (1981). 
